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As every man goes through life he fills in a number of forms for the
record, each containing a number of questions . .. There are thus
hundreds of little threads radiating from every man, millions of threads
in all. If these threads were suddenly to become visible, the whole
sky would look like a spider's web, and if they materialized as rubber
bands, buses, trams, and even people would lose the ability to move.
. . . They are not visible, they are not material, but every man is con-
stantly aware of their existence. . . . Each man, permanently aware
of his own invisible threads, naturally develops a respect for the people
who manipulate the threads.
Alexander Solzhenitsyn,
Cancer Ward'
1. A. SOLZHENrISYN, CANCER WARD (1968), quoted in DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, REcORDs CoMPUTERs AND THE RIGHITS OF CITIZENS 31 (1973)
(hereinafter cited as HEW REPORT].
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I. INTRODUCTION
Most of us have an intuitive sense of the meaning and value of pri-
vacy. As a legal matter, however, the term "privacy" has proved re-
markably elusive,2 and the dispute over what it means, what rights it
encompasses, and the degree of legal protection it deserves, rages un-
abated. The few Supreme Court efforts to find a constitutional footing
for privacy have been cautious, tentative, and confined to an examina-
tion of the individual's right to engage in activities intensely affecting
his person.3 The Court has yet to consider the constitutional status of
informational privacy-the individual's interest in controlling the flow
of personal information about him.4
Neither the paucity of case law nor the inability to define its contours
precisely can diminish the importance of informational privacy to mo-
dern American society. Today, information is power; the development
of the computer has enabled a person or institution acquiring infor-
mation about an individual to increase its control over that individual
in proportion to the data collected.; The decrease in individual free-
dom that necessarily accompanies this increase in external control is
repugnant to the goals of a democratic society.0 Underlying the debate
over privacy is a consensus that the loss of informational privacy pre-
sents an unprecedented threat to the integrity of the individual-and,
that the government has an affirmative duty to protect each citizen
from unwarranted external control as part of its general duty to pro-
mote individual freedom. The best evidence of this consensus is the
congressional decision to enact the Privacy Act of 1974 (Privacy
Act).7
This Note is about the Privacy Act. Part II will discuss how the com-
puter created a massive threat to individual privacy, rendered existing
legal protection wholly inadequate, and left no alternative to the enact-
2. A. WE N, PRIVACY AND FREDOm 7 (1967).
3. See note 40 infra.
4. For discussion of the constitutional bases of informational privacy, see Note,
Informational Privacy: Constitutional Challenges to the Collection and Dissemnination
of Personal Information by Government Agencies, 3 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 229 (1976).
5. See notes 14-22 infra and accompanying text.
6. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 93-1183, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1974): "In the past,
dictatorships have always come with hobnailed boots and tanks, and machine guns, but
a dictatorship of dossiers, a dictatorship of data banks can be just as repressive, just
as chilling, and just as debilitating on our constitutional protections."
7. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (Supp. V 1975).
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ment of federal privacy legislation.8 Part III will analyze the means
by which the Privacy Act attempts to recognize and ensure the
vitality of the individual's right to informational privacy.9 Finally,
Part IV will examine the manner in which the Privacy Act strives
to accommodate privacy with two of the many societal interests with
which it conflicts: effective law enforcement and the public's right to
know. "'
The conclusions of this Note are not optimistic. The Privacy Act is
conceptually sound, but practically unenforceable. Additionally, the
attempts to resolve the conflicts between privacy and interests with
which it competes are wholly unsatisfactory. Nevertheless, the recog-
nition that the Privacy Act is merely a first step dictates the conclusion
that it is a monumental step.
II. COMPUTERS AND PRIVACY
Unfortunately, the massive threat to privacy that gave rise to the Pri-
vacy Act emerged in large part from the government itself. Although
governments have kept records for thousands of years, 1 only recently
has the threat become epidemic. In the United States, the quantity of
information gathered about individuals increased steadily throughout
the twentieth century as it became apparent that large quantities of in-
formation were necessary for intelligent public decisions.' 2 Privacy
was not seriously threatened, however, because individuals were mobile
and information was stored in manual files that could not easily be trans-
ported. consolidated, analyzed, or retrieved. Technological limitations
and simple inefficiency preserved a reasonable balance between the in-
dividual seeking various benefits without sacrificing privacy, and the
8. See notes 11-53 infra and accompanying text.
9. See notes 54-156 infra and accompanying text.
10. See notes 157-273 infra and accompanying text.
11. For an outstanding discussion of the history of government record keeping from
Egyptian times to the present, see Federal Data Banks, Computers and the Bill of
Rights: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 836-46 (1971) (statement of A. Westin) [herein-
after cited as Data Bank Hearings].
12. See A. WESTIN, supra note 2, at 321-23. Professor Westin maintains that the
marked increase in data collection stems from the rejection of the theory that rational
governmental action could be based on limited facts and the acceptance of a behavioral-
predictive theory of information. See also HEW REPORT, supra note 1, at 34-35; Proj-
ect, Government Information and the Rights of Citizens, 73 MICH. L. Rnv. 971, 1222
(1975).
Vol. 1976:667]
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government, which needed, and could compel the surrender of, vast
amounts of personal data.' I
Recent technological advances enabled government employees to
shatter that balance. With the advent of the computer, the govern-
ment's ability to compile, retrieve, manipulate, analyze, and dissemi-
nate information has increased exponentially. A 1974 study of fifty-
four federal agencies disclosed 858 computerized data banks contain-
ing 1.25 billion records on individual citizens.1 4 The FBI's National
Crime Information Center alone contained over 1.7 million files and
195 million sets of fingerprints.' 5 Twenty-nine data banks, used exclu-
sively to maintain "black lists," contained damaging information about
thousands of law-abiding citizens. 6 One commentator estimates that
the average American citizen is the subject of at least twenty records.' 7
13. See Data Bank Hearings, supra note 11, at 69 (statement of J. Rosenberg).
See also Miller, Computers, Data Banks and Individual Privacy: An Overview, 4 COLUM.
HUMAN RIGHrs L. Rnv. 1 (1972); Ruggles, Pemberton & Miller, Symposium: Com-
puters, Data Banks, and Individual Privacy, 53 MINN. L REv. 211, 223, 228 (1968).
14. See STAFF OF THE SUBCOMM. ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE SENATE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 93D CONG., 2D SESS., FEDERAL DATA BANKS AND CONSTrru-
TIONAL RIGHTS IV (1974) [hereinafter cited as DATA BANK STUDY]; Project, supra note
12, at 1223-24.
15. See Countryman, The Diminishing Right of Privacy: The Personal Dossier &
the Computer, 49 TEx. L. Rv. 837, 853 (1971). See also HEW REPORT, supra note
1, at 13-15; Miller, supra note 13, at 5.
16. See DATA BANK STUDY, supra note 14, at xxxLx (summary of findings). Most
of these files were compiled and computerized by the Army, HUD, and the FCC. Per-
haps most shocking was the revelation that the Army "had been systematically keeping
watch on the lawful political activity of a number of groups and preparing Incident
reports and dossiers on individuals engaged in a wide range of legal protests." Miller,
supra note 13, at 4. See Countryman, supra note 15, at 857. For a collection of
press articles documenting the public uproar upon discovery of the Army's activities,
see Data Bank Hearings, supra note 11, pt. II, at 1607-09.
17. See Project, supra note 12, at 1224 (citing Records Maintained by Government
Agencies, Hearings on H.R. 9527 and Related Bills Before a Subcomm. of the House
Comm. on Government Operations, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1972) (statement of Repre-
sentative Patten)). See also DATA BANK STUDY, supra note 14, at iv; Karst, "The Flies":
Legal Controls Over the Accuracy and Accessibility of Stored Personal Data, 31 LAw
& CONTEMP. PROB. 342, 343-44 (1966). Individuals are generally unaware of the multi-
tude of ways in which personal information is collected. For example,
[w]hether he knows it or not, whenever an American travels on a com-
mercial airline, reserves a room at one of the national hotel chains, rents a
car, he is likely to leave distinctive electronic tracks in the memory of a com-
puter that can tell a great deal about his activities,-his movements, his habits
and associations.
Data Bank Hearings, supra note 11, at 9 (statement of A. Miller).
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For several reasons, the exponential increase in governmental re-
cordkeeping ability poses a unique threat to personal privacy. The
most obvious danger is the computer's ability to combine scattered bits
of data into a comprehensive personal dossier." This capacity permits
government agents to make far more effective, and consequently more
intrusive, use of information already in government files. 19
Second, the increased capacity to handle information creates strong
pressures to acquire more of it. Using either legal compulsion or subtle
18. The crux of the problem is that the computer has enabled government to collect
"too much data." The mere compilation of vast personal dossiers offends privacy by
creating a "potential 'record-prison' for millions of Americans, as past mistakes, omis-
sions, or misunderstood events become permanent evidence ... ." A. WESTIN, supra
note 2, at 160. See HEW REPORT, supra note 1, at 12-15; Countryman, supra note 15,
at 868; Miller, supra note 13, at 1-3. Professor Countryman maintains that our con-
tinued worship of efficiency and failure to discard the misconception that whatever is effi-
cient is desirable will result in the destruction of privacy. Countryman, supra, at 869. He
argues that "we have not, in this country, permitted efficiency to be the determining fac-
tor when individual liberty is jeopardized." Id. at 870. Countryman somberly colacludes
that the computer cannot be controlled and that "[t]he only hope for substantial pro-
tection of privacy against the computerized dossiers. . . is that they not exist-at least
• ..not exist on their present scale." Id. at 869.
19. For example, standardized computer languages and remote access to computer
terminals allow the instantaneous transfer of information between data banks or from
a data bank to any person with access to a computer terminal. Recently there has been
a movement to centralize all information about an individual in one data bank. As
Alan Westin has noted:
Compared to manual files, computers offer greater storage capacity for data;
greater speed of processing; lower processing cost per item of information;
greater capacity for complex logical operation; simultaneous access to multiple
records; ability to link data on the same person, place, or thing from different
files; remote access to central facilities for input and output; and the ability
to exchange information with other computer systems.
Data Bank Hearings, supra note 11, at 838. See also Countryman, supra note 15, at
863; Miller, Personal Privacy in the Computer Age: The Challenge of a New Technol-
ogy in an Information-Oriented Society, 67 MicrH. L. Rav. 1089, 1093-1103 (1969);
Comment, The Computer Data Bank-Privacy Controversy Revisited: An Analysis and
an Administrative Proposal, 22 CATH. U. L. REV. 628, 635 (1973).
Public reaction to the computer-based privacy invasion, initially slow to develop,
erupted upon disclosure of formal proposals for a National Data Center, which would
have consolidated information held by all government agencies. For a discussion of
the trend towards centralization and the National Data Center, see DATA BANK STUDY,
supra note 14, at xv-xviii; Meldman, Centralized Information Systems and the Legal
Right to Privacy, 52 MARQ. L. REV. 335 (1969); Miller, supra, at 1131-40; Note, Privacy
and Efficient Government: Proposals for a National Data Center, 82 HARV. L. Rpy. 400,
406 (1968).
Although the proposal for a National Data Center was defeated, the "vast numbers
of personal dossiers already assembled by private and official compilers have effectively
created a 'National Data Bank' now." Countryman, supra at 863.
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coercion,2 ° federal agencies quickly seized the opportunity to ac-
quire huge quantities of personal information,21 much of it irrelevant
to any legitimate government duty.22  Moreover, unqualified investiga-
tors often solicited data from third parties and compiled dossiers replete
with information that was inaccurate, biased, or simply fabricated by the
investigator.2 8 Few persons know the importance of, or even the exist-
ence of, such personal records. Until 1974, individuals aware of these
records could not inspect them, challenge their accuracy, or restrict
their use.24
Finally, the computer's own fallibility poses a significant threat to
personal privacy. Contrary to popular belief, computers do errY, The
advent of remote terminals and universal computer language makes
possible inter-data bank transfers, both authorized and unauthorized.
The latter constitute simple theft, to which computer records are more
vulnerable than manual records.2 8  Authorized information transfers
raise the prospect of contextual inaccuracy. 27  Information supplied to
20. See Miller, supra note 19, at 1137.
21. "The inevitable result of using computers is that the investigator acquires two
or three times as much personal information . . . as was ever collected before because
of the physical or cost limitations of acquisition." A. WuS-IN, supra note 2, at 160. See
Ruggles, Pemberton & Miller, supra note 13, at 229.
22. Data Bank Hearings, supra note 11, at 11 (statement of A. Miller); Address
by Senator Ervin, Spring Joint Computer Conference (May 20, 1971), reprinted in Data
Bank Hearings, supra note 11, pt. I1, at 1552; Ruggles, Pemberton & Miller, supra note
13, at 229. See also S. RP. No. 93-1183, supra note 6, at 11.
23. See Countryman, supra note 15, at 83943; Miller, supra note 19, at 1141-42.
24. See Countryman, supra note 15, at 844. Professor Countryman argues that
even in those rare instances when an individual realizes that constant credit or employ-
ment rejections are attributable to a damaging record, he is unable to secure access
to the record, and thus relief is impossible.
25. See Miller, supra note 19, at 1109-18. Accidental disclosures, dust, and related
mechanical failures can also be extremely damaging to personal privacy.
26. See Data Bank Hearings, supra note 11, at 470-73 (statement of R. Hen-
derson) (discussing security developments); Grenier, Computers and Privacy: A
Proposal for Self-Regulation, 1970 DuKE L.J. 495, 496; Miller, supra note 19, at 1109-
14; Comment, Public Access to Government-Held Computerized Information, 68 Nw.
U.L. REv. 433 (1973).
27. For example, where an individual is listed as a felon on a computerized record,
but the offense, civil disobedience, is not recorded, the party receiving the data is likely
to misinterpret it. Other frequent examples of contextual inaccuracy arise when employ-
ment ratings are transmitted to users who do not have access to the rating criterion.
See, e.g., HEW REPORT, supra note 1, at 19; Miller, supra note 19, at 1115-17; Ruggles,
Pemberton & Miller, supra note 13, at 230; Comment, supra note 19, at 636-37.
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one agency for one purpose is often transmitted to other agencies for
wholly unrelated purposes. 8  Deprived of its contextual background,
the data may be misinterpreted, often to the disadvantage of the person
whom it concerns.
These technological forces have had a devastating impact on person-
al privacy. Increasingly, almost all that we do, and particularly the mis-
takes we make, are recorded in government files. Neither the passage
of time nor departure to a new community can erase these blem-
ishes on our records, 29 records that are consulted with increasing fre-
quency whenever we apply for employment, credit, insurance, or
other important benefits. We live in what one commentator calls a "rec-
ord prison." 0  Almost all of us have committed some act at some time
that would seriously jeopardize our chances in life if recorded, retained
indefinitely, and disclosed on a regular basis.3 1 The technological
breakthroughs in information handling may deprive people of the op-
portunity for a fresh start in life, a disastrous result because
[i]f we want man to be self-realized . .. [wie have got to give
him opportunities to fall on his face, to blunder occasionally, to make
mistakes. We are human, and possess frailties . . . [i]f we put
another wall or barrier up, or some kind of fear in front of people, they
can become very reluctant to experiment and life will be very disap-
pointing and confining for many.3 2
Moreover, data derived from a computer carries an impact dispropor-
tionate to its actual value. Too often, those who consult computerized
records assume the accuracy of the data presented and rarely consider
that personalized information in such files may be irrelevant to their
needs, factually or contextually inaccurate, dated, or incompelete. 33 The
28. The computer has made it too easy for too many people to gain access to per-
sonal files. See HEW REPORT, supra note 1, at 13; Karst, supra note 17, at 342-43;
Miller, supra note 13, at 230; Comment, supra note 26, at 433.
29. See Data Bank Hearings, supra note 11, pt. I, at 31 (remarks of S. Ervin):
"[A] computer has marvelous gifts of memory far beyond any human being . . .and
at the same time it lacks virtues of human beings, such as the virtue of compassion and
the willingness to forget and forgive some of our offenses."
30. A. WESrN, supra note 2, at 160. See note 18 supra.
31. See A. WESTIN, supra note 2, at 160; Data Bank Hearings, supra note 11, pt. I,
at 31 (remarks of S. Ervin); Comment, supra note 19, at 638-39.
32. Data Bank Hearings, supra note 11, at 83 (statement of J. Rosenberg).
33. See A. WESTIN, supra note 2, at 160; Miller, supra note 19, at 1116; cf. Warren
& Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193, 196 (1890) (discussing nine-
teenth century tendency to rely excessively on printed words).
Vol. 1976:667]
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innocent subject of the unreliable record, however, is usually either ig-
norant of its existence or incapable of correcting it.8"
Finally, the mere capacity to acquire such records may seriously
injure the human interests that the concept of privacy protects.
The mere collection and retention of sensitive or personal infor-
mation creates a state of severe psychological insecurity. 5 As peo-
ple begin to feel they are under constant surveillance, they will be-
gin to evaluate themselves and regulate their conduct with reference
to what is, or may be, contained in their computerized records.8 0
None of these threats to individual freedom and dignity was planned
or even foreseen. Each has arisen as the inadvertent by-product of in-
formation techniques essential to the solution of pressing social needs.
Striking a balance between the individual interest in privacy and the
government interest in social progress is an extraordinarily difficult
task. What makes that task urgent is the speed and completeness with
which the computer has destroyed the balance that previously existed . 7
Prior to the Privacy Act of 1974, the law afforded little pro-
tection from the dangers of extensive recordkeeping systems.18 In both
34. See Data Bank Hearings, supra note 11, at 17 (statement of A. Miller); Coun-
tryman, supra note 15, at 844.
35. See DATA BANuK S-TmY, supra note 14, at xviii (statement of A. Miller): "It is
not essential that dossiers, files, surveillance, actually are used to repress people. If
these activities give the appearance of repression that in itself has a chilling effect on
the precious rights guaranteed. . . by the Constitution. . ....
36. See A. WasTiN, supra note 2, at 323; Data Bank Hearings, supra note 11, at 10
(statement of A. Miller); Miller, supra note 13, at 6 (discussing impact of computers
on exercise of first amendment rights); Note, supra note 19, at 637-39.
37. As Professor Miller has noted:
The computer is a many-splendored animal. It is myopic to think of it
as little more than a high speed calculator with a gland condition ....
We must recognize that we are dealing with a new technology, whose applica-
tions are just beginning to be perceived and whose capacity to deprive us of
our privacy simply cannot be measured in terms of existing systems ....
Ruggles, Pemberton & Miller, supra note 13, at 225-27.
38. Commentators unanimously agreed that the existing legal structure was totally
incapable of coping with the threats posed by computers. See, e.g., HEW RuPouT, supra
note 1, at 34-35; Beaney, The Right to Privacy and American Law, 31 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROB. 253, 258-59 (1966); Countryman, supra note 15, at 864; Kalven, Privacy in Tort
Law-Were Warren and Brandeis .Wrong?, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 326, 327 (1966);
Karst, supra note 17, at 350; Meldman, supra note 19, at 352; Miller, supra note 19,
at 1207; Sills, Automated Data Processing and the Issue of Privacy, 1 SETON HALL
L. REV. 7, 19 (1970). See also Shibley v. Time, 40 Ohio Misc. 51, 321 N.E.2d 791
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constitutional and common law interpretation, courts have awkwardly
followed in the footsteps of technology while attempting to construct
a legal framework to protect the right of privacy." Although the Su-
preme Court has enunciated a constitutional right of privacy which
emanates from penumbras of the Bill of Rights and is necessary to en-
sure the vitality of specific guarantees,40 the Court has yet to directly
address informational privacy as a constitutional right.41  The common
law provides little more protection.4 2
The common law of informational privacy was designed primarily to
compensate a victim for injuries inflicted by the mass media.4 3  To re-
cover on a cause of action for invasion of privacy, an individual must
ordinarily prove public disclosure of intimate facts.44 Most injuries aris-
ing from misuse of records involve neither. The law of privacy is in-
tertwined with the law of defamation, so that communications subject
to a qualified privilege under defamation law are not actionable in a suit
for invasion of privacy. 5 In the majority of cases, disclosures made
for employment or credit determinations are qualifiedly privileged.
Traditionally, consent was a defense in a privacy suit, and courts
applied it liberally when information voluntarily surrendered for a spe-
(Ct. C.P. 1974) (holding sale of names not an actionable invasion of privacy and apolo-
gizing to plaintiff for the pitiful state of the law).
39. For discussion of the development of the right to privacy, see HEW RIPORT,
supra note 1, at 34-35; Long, The Right to Privacy: The Case Against the Government,
10 ST. Louis U.L.J. 1 (1965); Sills, supra note 38, at 10-17.
40. See Griswold x. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right to privacy in penum-
bras of first eight amendments protects interest of married persons in using contracep-
tives). See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right to privacy encompasses
woman's interest in having an abortion); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (right
to privacy embodied in first amendment protects individual's interest in viewing por-
nography at home); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (right to privacy found
in fourth amendment protects individuals against warrantless wiretap); Beaney, supra
note 38, at 253 (1966); Gross, The Concept of Privacy, 42 N.Y.U. L. REv. 34 (1967).
41. For a discussion of the constitutional dimensions of informational privacy, see
Note, supra note 4.
42. See notes 43-47 infra.
43. See Meldman, supra note 19, at 340-48; Data Bank Hearings, supra note 11,
at 17 (statement of A. Miller); Miller, supra note 19, at 1156-60.
44. See note 43 supra; Karst, supra note 17, at 346. Accordingly, if accurate infor-
mation is disclosed, an individual cannot recover absent publication to a large number
of people. False disclosures will often be subject to a qualified privilege. Id. See
note 45 infra.
45. The qualified privilege covers both communications that are made in good faith
and those in which the communicator has an interest. See Karst, supra note 17, at
346-47; Miller, supra note 19, at 1158-62; Note, supra note 19, at 631-32.
Vol. 1976:667]
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cific reason is used for totally unrelated purposes.40 Law suits are costly
and time consuming; damages are difficult to determine and frequently
inadequate. 4r Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the victim is often
unaware that a computerized record containing damaging information
is the cause of his injury.
On a more fundamental level, it is wholly unreasonable to expect
courts alone to protect personal privacy because there is no adequate
definition of the concept.48  Several leading commentators have urged
46. See Project, supra note 12, at 1241-42 (discussing recent developments). Con-
sent may be express or implied. Courts have upheld the defense notwithstanding
the use of coercion to obtain the information. See Meldman, supra note 19, at 349;
Miller, supra note 19, at 1170-73 (noting inappropriate applications of the defense as
well as countervailing tendency of courts to scrutinize carefully claims that consent was
given).
47. See Meldman, supra note 19, at 352; Comment, supra note 19, at 631-32. See
also Karst, supra note 17, at 351. "Restitution in any literal sense is simply impossible
in the context of disclosures of sensitive data; once made, a disclosure can never be
erased." Id.
48. See A. WnsriN, supra note 2, at 7: "Few values so fundamental to society
as privacy have been left so undefined in social theory or have been the subject of such
vague and confusing writing by social scientists." See also Sills, supra note 38, at 11.
Commentators have argued intensely over whether there is in fact an independent
right to privacy. Dean Prosser maintained that the right to privacy was merely an
expedient legal device employed by courts to protect several independent interests "which
are tied together by a common name but otherwise have almost nothing in common."
W. PRossm, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 117, at 804 (4th ed. 1971). See also
Sills, supra note 38, at 11; Note, supra note 19, at 406.
Professor Bloustein, Prosser's leading critic, urged that privacy is a truly independent
interest that protects individual dignity and integrity. See Bloustein, Privacy as an As-
pect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U.L REV. 962, 971
(1964). For criticism of both Prosser and Bloustein, see Gross, supra note 40; cf.
Kalven, supra note 38, at 327 (tort law should not protect privacy at all). The debate
is significant, since only Bloustein's thesis is broad enough to allow the erection of new
principles capable of averting the computer based threat to privacy. See Bloustein, supra,
at 1006; Project, supra note 12, at 1232-39. Specifically, Dean Prosser's theory of pri-
vacy is merely a method derived from existing case law, designed to provide sensible
resolutions to problems caused by mass-media disclosure of extremely personal informa-
tion. It cannot be adapted to cope with the computer-based privacy invasion.
Professor Bloustein's theory, under which privacy is defined broadly as the interest
in protecting individual dignity, is more readily adaptable. The advantage of the Blou-
stein thesis is that it can accomodate the regulation of any kind of threat to individual
dignity and assures that "new techniques could not outflank the law." The problem
with the Bloustein thesis is that it provides absolutely no guide to aid in determining
what constitutes an actionable invasion of privacy. If privacy is defined in such broad
terms it will ultimately be necessary to delineate the scope of legal protection against
the misuse of computers with rules comparable to those developed by Dean Prosser.
Thus, it does not matter if privacy is defined narrowly with reference to a specific
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1976/iss4/4
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that privacy is the "right to determine when, how, and to what extent
information is . . . communicated to others. '49  A control-oriented
definition of privacy will permit elimination of some of the grosser
abuses by records custodians. This definition alone can never guide the
courts to a reasonable approach to privacy, however, because it does not
facilitate a quantitative assessment of the right to privacy. 50 Yet such
quantification is essential because the amorphous nature of information,
its many uses, and the degree to which privacy conflicts with such other
critical social interests as freedom of expression and law enforce-
ment dictate that the right to privacy can never be absolute. 51
Commentators recognized the judicial inability to resolve the prob-
lems created by the computer and directed their attention to Con-
threat, such as the computer, or broadly, with accompanying legal rules to cope with
that threat. The crucial point is that the legal system must recognize the need for
flexibility so that the law can adapt to new technological threats. We can no more
expect to transfer rules adopted today to cope with the problems of tomorrow than
we can "attempt a literal transfer of rules that were framed for a vanished environment."
Data Bank Hearings, supra note 11, at 835 (statement of A. Westin). Thus, the legal
framework must be agreed upon before the law can proceed to struggle with the prob-
lems posed by computers.
49. A. WEsTiN, supra note 2, at 7. Professor Westin maintains that protection of
privacy is crucial to a free society because: (1) it fosters self-reliant citizens; (2) it al-
lows experimentation and innovation by private parties; and, (3) it stifles government
tendencies toward totalitarianism. See Data Bank Hearings, supra note 11, at 835 (state-
ment of A. Westin). Arthur Miller asserts that although privacy is impossible to define,
it has begun to be seen as an "individual's ability to control the flow of information
concerning or describing him." Miller, supra note 19, at 1107. Miller and Westin
had a strong influence on the Senate subcommittee investigating computerized data
banks. The committee combined the Miller and Westin conceptions and defined pri-
vacy as "the capacity ...to determine what information about the individual will be
collected and disseminated to others. Privacy also involves a subjective sense of self-
determination and control over personal information." DATA BANK STUDY, supra note
14, at ix. For additional proposed definitions of privacy, see Beaney, supra note 38,
at 254; Gross, supra note 40, at 34; Jourard, Some Psychological Aspects of Privacy,
31 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 307 (1966); Project, supra note 12, at 224-26; Comment,
supra note 19, at 630-31. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 323 (1967) (Douglas,
J., dissenting).
Several commentators have urged that individuals should have a property right in
all information pertaining to them "with all the restraints on interference by public
or private authorities and due process guarantees that our law of property has been
so skillful at devising." Miller, supra note 19, at 1223-28.
50. See note 48 supra.
51. See HEW REPORT, supra note 1, at 38-40; A. WESTiN, supra note 2, at 7;
Beaney, supra note 38, at 256; Miller, supra note 19, at 1162-70, 1193-1200; Comment,
supra note 19, at 629; notes 157-273 infra and accompanying text. Additionally, total
protection for privacy is neither possible nor desirable. See Meldman, supra note 19,
at 352.
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gress,152 which responded by passing the Privacy Act of 1974.53 The
remainder of this Note will assess the degree to which the Act permits
effective control of government abuses of personal records and ade-
quate resolution of the conflict between individual privacy and social
responsibility.
BE. THE PRIVACY AcT-A GENERAL ASSESSMENT
The Privacy Act of 1974 has three broad goals-to recognize indi-
viduals' interests in government records concerning them, to regulate
the information practices of federal agencies, and to strike an appropri-
ate balance between the need of the "individual American for a maxi-
mum degree of privacy over personal information he furnishes his gov-
ernment, and. . . that of the government for information about the in-
dividual which it finds necessary to carry out its legitimate functions."' 4
The first two goals of the Act are essentially similar: increasing the indi-
vidual's control over his records necessarily restricts agency control.
This section will discuss the mechanisms by which the Act seeks to
achieve these two generally compatible goals.
The section will begin with a brief review of the Privacy Act's cha-
otic legislative history, a prerequisite to understanding its many incon-
sistencies. Next, it will discuss the individual interests recognized
by the Act, analyzing them in terms of the Act's three conceptual
focal points-collection of new information, maintenance of files, and
disclosure of agency records to other persons or institutions. The third
part of this section will employ the same analytic framework to assess
the Act's restrictions on agency information practices. Finally, this sec-
tion will discuss the civil remedies available to a citizen whose rights
under the Act are ignored by a federal agency.
The conclusions reached are generally pessimistic. Although the
Act is conceptually sound, the mechanisms used to implement these
concepts are likely to prove ineffective. To enforce its substantive pro-
visions, the Act relies primarily on individual initiative, yet provides
citizens with neither the means to discover agency violations nor the
52. See, e.g., HEW REPORT, supra note 1, at 34-35; Beaney, supra note 38, at 264;
Meldman, supra note 19, at 352; Comment, supra note 19, at 635.
53. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (Supp. V 1975).
54. H.R. REP. No. 93-1416, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1974). For a discussion of
the Privacy Act, see Project, supra note 12, at 1303-40.
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incentive to rectify them. In short, the Act is conceptually sound but
pragmatically unenforceable.
A. Legislative History
The legislative history of the Privacy Act is both extraordinary and
significant. The final enactment of the statute ended an outstanding
demonstration of legislative chaos. The House of Representatives and
the Senate originally passed separate, materially different privacy
bills." The Senate sent its bill to the House, which retained the Sen-
ate's enacting clause and substituted the House bill in its entirety
thereafter. 6 Facing strong pressure to enact some type of privacy leg-
islation before the end of the session, and lacking adequate time for a
conference committee, House and Senate committee leaders held a
series of informal meetings. These meetings ultimately produced a
compromise bill derived in part from the original Senate bill, in part
from the original House bill, and in part from entirely new amend-
ments."7
The consequence of this hasty and haphazard legislative process is
an internally inconsistent statute with no reliable indication of congres-
sional intent. The original committee reports are of limited value in in-
terpreting the final statute. The only reliable legislative history con-
sists of a rather skimpy staff analysis of the compromise amendments
appearing in the Congressional Record.5" Consequently, courts are
likely to have great difficulty interpreting the Act and vigorous enforce-
ment may be impossible.
B. Recognition of Individual Interests
The Privacy Act explicitly assumes that informational privacy "is a
personal and fundamental right protected by the Constitution,'" re-
spect for which is essential to our government.60 By various means, the
55. H.R. 16373, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); S. 3418, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
56. See 120 CONG. REc. H11,661 (daily ed. Dec. 11, 1974).
57. See 120 CONG. REC. S21,811 (daily ed. Dec. 17, 1974).
58. Analysis of House and Senate Compromise Amendments to the Federal Privacy
Act, printed in 120 CONG. REC. S21,817 (daily ed. Dec. 17, 1974) and in 120 CONG.
Rac. H 12,243 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1974).
59. Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, § 2(a) (4), 88 Stat. 1897. See H.R.
REP. No. 93-1416, supra note 54, at 9.
60. See S. REP. No. 93-1183, supra note 6, at 14 ("[tlhe premise underlying this
legislation is that good government and efficient management require that basic principles
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Act attempts to enable individuals to limit the collection, maintenance,
and dissemination of personal information about them.
1. Collection
Subsection (e)"1 of the Privacy Act establishes specific collection
regulations for each federal agency that maintains a system of records.
Several of these restrictions implicitly recognize the individual's inter-
est in limiting government acquisition of personal data about him.
For example, subsection (e)(3)6 2 attempts to ensure that an individ-
ual's decision to surrender information about himself to the govern-
ment is intelligent and voluntary. Accordingly, agencies must disclose
to persons from whom they seek information:
(A) the authority (whether granted by statute, or by executive order
of the President) which authorizes the solicitation of the information and
whether disclosure of such information is mandatory or voluntary;
(B) the principal purpose or purposes for which the information is
intended to be used;
(C) the routine uses which may be made of the information, as pub-
lished pursuant to paragraph (4)(D) of this subsection; and
(D) the effects on him, if any, of not providing all or any part of
the requested information . . ..
In theory this section permits individuals to resist disclosures that are
not explicitly authorized by statute or executive order. In practice,
however, the free choice granted by this section may be illusory if, as
in the past, individuals must waive their right to withhold personal in-
formation when applying for a government job or benefit. '
Subsection (e) (7) " recognizes another important individual inter-
est-that some personal information is ordinarily beyond the scope of
any legitimate government inquiry. 6  This subsection prohibits agen-
cies from collecting or maintaining any "record describing how any
of privacy, confidentiality and due process must apply to all personal information pro-
grams...").
61. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e) (Supp. V 1975).
62. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e) (3) (Supp. V 1975).
63. Id.
64. See note 20 supra.
65. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e) (7) (Supp. V 1975).
66., This provision, like subsection e(1), see notes 115-20 infra, is "aimed particu-
larly at preventing collection of protected information not immediately needed, about
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individual exercises rights guaranteed by the First Amendment unless
expressly authorized by statute or by the individual about whom the
record is maintained or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an
authorized law enforcement activity." 7  The concept that some infor-
mation belongs only to the individual is extremely important. 8 As
one commentator has noted, however, Congress' decision to define this
category of "untouchable information" in terms of the first amendment
was unfortunate. 9 Moreover, the exemption for law enforcement
activity opens a loophole that threatens to swallow the rule,70 a prob-
lem that Section mI of this Note will consider in detail.
2. Maintenance of Files
Subsection (d)" explicitly recognizes the individual's interest in
gaining access to and correcting errors in personal records. Subsection
(d)(1) provides: "Each agency that maintains a system of records
law-abiding Americans, on the off-chance that Government ...might possibly have
to deal with them in the future." S. REP. No. 93-1183, supra note 6, at 57. For discus-
sion of the compromise amendment, see 120 CONG. REc. S21,816 (daily ed. Dec. 17,
1974).
67. 5 U.S.C. 552a(e) (7) (Supp. V 1975) (emphasis added).
68, See note 49 supra.
69. See Project, supra note 12, at 1308-09 (criticizing subsection (e)(7) for failing
to prohibit collection about other activities unprotected by the first amendment). See
also Office of Management and Budget, Privacy Act Implementation Guidelines and
Responsibilities, 40 Fed. Reg. 28,949 (1975) [hereinafter cited as OMB Guidelines].
The OMB Guidelines direct agencies to "apply the broadest reasonable interpreta-
tion" in determining whether or not a particular activity is protected by the first amend-
ment. Id. at 28,965. Although the Guidlines structly limit the use of the subsection
(e)(7) exception to acquisition expressly authorized by statute, they fail to provide
adequate guidance for agencies attempting to determine if the collection of informa-
tion concerning a suspect's first amendment rights would be "pertinent to and within the
scope of an authorized law enforcement activity." Id.
70. The primary problem with this section is that the exception is overly broad.
Although there are many instances in which law enforcement agencies require informa-
tion pertaining to the exercise of a subject's first amendment rights, there is no way
to assure that agencies will refrain from collecting such information "unless pertinent
to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity." The exemption
may well perpetuate precisely those "fishing expeditions" that subsection (e)(7) is de-
signed to preclude. See 120 CoNG. REc. H10,892 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1974) (purpose
of the exemption is to assure that "political and religious activities are not used as
a cover for illegal or subversive activities").
71. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(d) (Supp. V 1975).
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shall-(1) upon request by any individual to gain access to his record
or to any information pertaining to him . ..permit him . . . to
review the record .... "71 Subsections (d)(2)-(4)73 enable the individ-
ual to object to the contents of a personal record, institute proceedings
to correct it, and request that notice of the objection be sent to those who
have previously received the record. 74  These provisions are the heart
of the Privacy Act and constitute a major conceptual advance. 7  This
subsection recognizes that an individual has a continuing interest in
information about him collected by the government.7  For the first
time, an individual can examine his records and ensure their accuracy.
The access provisions in subsection (d) are also the key to enforc-
ing the other provisions of the Privacy Act. The Act relies almost
exclusively on individual initiative for enforcement.7 7 Consequently,
unless the individual has access to his files, he will lack both the knowl-
edge and the incentive to challenge agency lapses. If an agency fails
to maintain the list of disclosures required by subsection (c),78 or
retains stale and unreliable information in violation of subsections
(e)(1) and (e)(5), 7a the individual can take corrective action only
if he learns of the violation via the access provision of subsection
(d).8 0  The enforcement of the entire Act, therefore, depends on the
efficacy of subsection (d) in granting individuals access to their files.
On this critical point, the Privacy Act's sound concepts are as a prac-
tical matter deficient. The original Senate bill required agencies to
take affirmative action to notify every subject of the existence of a
government file about him."' The abandonment of this provision
72. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(d)(1) (Supp. V 1975).
73. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(d)(2)-(4) (Supp. V 1975).
74. For a discussion of these provisions, see OMB Guidelines, supra note 69, at
28,958-60.
75. See note 24 supra.
76. See S. REP. No. 93-1183, supra note 6, at 20. An agency may not refuse the
subject access to a record because of lack of proper interest. See OMB Guidelines,
supra note 69, at 28,957.
77. See notes 136-57 infra.
78. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(c) (Supp. V 1975); see note 85 infra.
79. See notes 115 & 124 infra.
80. The individual may learn of the existence of a record if an agency requests
his consent prior to disclosing a record about him pursuant to subsection (b) (conditions
of disclosure). Unfortunately the broad exemptions and the general "prior consent"
provision to subsection (b) will frequently prevent an individual from discovering the
existence of personal records about him. See note 91 infra and accompanying text.
81. See S. REP. No. 93-1183, supra note 6, at 59; note 89 infra.
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threatens to render the Act entirely unenforceable. An individual will
not know that he is the subject of a record unless he initiates a request
under subsection (d). He can exercise his rights under this provision
only after combing the Federal Register to discover which agencies
maintain records and contacting each agency that could conceivably
have a record about him.82 Relatively few individuals have sufficient
time, money, knowledge, and initiative to attempt to discover the exist-
ence of files about them, much less begin proceedings to challenge the
contents of a file. Accordingly, subsection (d) is commendable for rec-
ognizing the individual's continued interest in personal information
held by the government. As a mechanism to enforce the Privacy Act,
however, it is virtually worthless.
3. Disclosure of Records
The Privacy Act recognizes another crucial aspect of the individual's
continuing interest in government held data concerning him-limiting
its disclosure.13  Subsection (b) addresses this goal, providing that un-
less one of eleven exemptions applies, "[n]o agency shall disclose any
record which is contained in a system of records by any means of com-
munication to any person, or to another agency, except pursuant to a
written request by, or with the prior written consent of the individual
to whom the record pertains .... ,,84 Subsection (c) enables an in-
dividual to assure agency compliance with subsection (b) by requiring
agencies to keep an accounting of the date, nature, purpose, and recip-
ient of each disclosure. 5
82. See notes 96-98 infra and accompanying text.
83. See S. REP. No. 93-1183, supra note 6, at 68.
84. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) (Supp. V 1975) (emphasis added). Neither this, nor any
other provision of the Privacy Act authorizes disclosure to a person other than the
subject of a record. See OMB Guidelines, supra note 69, at 28,953.
85. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(c) (Supp. V 1975). The accounting is intended: 1) to enable
individuals to discover those to whom their records have been disclosed; 2) to facilitate
the correction of erroneous records; and 3) to allow individuals to force agency compli-
ance with the disclosure provisions of subsection (b).
Subsection (c) (2) requires agencies to retain all accountings "for at least five years
or the life of the record, whichever is longer, after the disclosure for which the account-
ing is made." 5 U.S.C. § 552a(c) (2) (Supp. V 1975). This provision was the result
of a compromise between the House and Senate Committees. See 120 CoNG. Ruc.
821,817 (daily ed. Dec. 17, 1974). Subsection (c)(3) requires agencies to allow the
subject of a record to examine any accounting but those required for law enforcement
Vol. 1976:667]
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Once again these provisions are conceptually sound. In the past, in-
teragency transfers of personal information were routine,80 and raised
substantial problems of contextual inaccuracy.17  More serious is the
inequity of disclosing the individual's personal information for uses he
has never contemplated and of which he would not approve.88  An en-
forceable consent requirement would not only obviate these problems,
but would, in addition, partially compensate for the Act's failure to re-
quire notification to individual subjects of records. 89 The request for
permission to disclose personal records will notify the subject of their
existence, permitting him to exercise his rights under subsection (d). 0
For two reasons, however, subsection (b) may fail to fulfill these
additional and necessary roles. First, the provision in subsection (b)
permitting disclosure without notice to, or specific consent by, subjects
who have given prior written consent9 opens a major loophole. Agen-
cies may attempt to evade the consent requirement by simply inserting
routine waiver provisions in the original request for information.
Accordingly, courts should construe this provision narrowly and reject
an agency's claim of prior consent absent a clause in the original re-
quest specifically stipulating not only the anticipated uses, but the po-
tential recipients of the data as well. 92 Second, the exemptions to the
consent requirement are far too broad and threaten to destroy the
individual's ability to control the flow of personal information. Sub-
purposes pursuant to subsection (b) (7). See note 167 infra. No accounting is necessary
for disclosures required by the FOIA. See notes 259-61 infra and accompanying text).
86. See note 28 supra.
87. See notes 27-28 supra.
88. See note 28 supra.
89. The original draft of the Senate bill required an agency to notify all individuals
about whom the agency maintained personal information. This requirement was aban-
doned due to the allegedly prohibitive cost of notification. Instead, the Act relies totally
on the initiative of concerned citizens to seek out information pertaining to them. See
S. REP. No. 93-1183, supra note 6, at 59.
The Senate bill also provided for a Privacy Commission responsible in part for pub-
lishing a Directory of Information Systems designed to enable individuals to discover
easily if an agency maintained a personal record about them. The Act as passed con-
tains no such provision, and individuals who wish to learn if any personal records about
them exist must study the Federal Register religiously. See notes 100-06 infra and
accompanying text.
90. See notes 72-74 supra.
91. See text accompanying note 84 supra.
92. See OMB Guidelines, supra note 69, at 28,954. Informing an individual of
the purpose for which information will be used does not Constitute prior consont to
disslosure of such information, Id,
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section (b)(3), for instance, is perhaps the largest loophole in the Pri-
vacy Act. This subsection allows an agency to disclose personal rec-
ords to other agencies without the subject's consent if the disclosure
is for a "routine use. '19 3  The Act defines a routine use as one whose
"purpose . . . is compatible with the purpose for which [the record]
was collected." The original Senate bill contained no such exemption
and would have placed tight restrictions on interagency transfers of in-
formation."' Under the enacted statute, however, an agency need only
publish anticipated routine uses in the Federal Register. 6 Few Ameri-
cans arc aware of the existence of the Federal Register; still fewer
read it on a regular basis. Consequently, most individuals will never
learn that an agency has declared a routine use and will be unable to
challenge effectively wrongful agency declarations.
As a practical matter, subsection (b) does not significantly restrict
interagency transfers; it merely requires agencies to consider in ad-
vance how information will be used. 98
C. Restrictions on Federal Agencies
To complement and solidify the individual interests recognized in the
Privacy Act, Congress imposed specific limitations on federal agencies
that gather and use personal information. The substantive restrictions
contained in subsections (b) and (e) parallel the individual interests
they are designed to promote.9 9 These substantive rules govern collec-
tion of new data, maintenance of new and existing files, and disclosure
of agency records.
The Act also establishes various procedural requirements, of which
93. 5 US.C. § 552a(b)(3) (Supp. V 1975).
94. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a) (7) (Supp. V 1975). This exemption is intended to "rec-
ognize the practical limitations of restricting use of information to explicit and express
purposes for which it was collected." OMB Guidelines, supra note 69, at 16-17. One
harmless example of a routine use given in the OMB Guidelines is the transfer of
information from an agency to the Treasury Department for processing of payroll
checks. Id.
95. See S. REP. No. 93-1183, supra note 6, at 72-73. This provision constitutes
a major concession to the House. See 120 CONG. R1-c. S21,815 (daily ed. Dec. 17,
1974).
96. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(4)(D) (Supp. V 1975).
97. But see Project, supra note 12, at 1316.
98. See 120 CONG. REC. S21,816 (daily ed. Dec. 17, 1974); OMB Guidelines, supra
note 69, at 28,953.
99. See notes 62-98 supra and 100-33 infra and accompanying text.
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subsection (e) (4)00 is the most critical. This subsection requires each
agency that maintains a system of records to publish an annual notice
in the Federal Register of the existence, character, name, and location
of each system.' 10 The annual notice must also specify the categories
of individuals about whom information is maintained, 102 the kind of in-
formation maintained, 03 all routine uses of such data,10 4 procedures by
which an individual may discover if an agency's system contains a rec-
ord about him,' - and how he may gain access to the record. 00
These procedural restrictions serve several functions. Public dis-
closure of the existence of record systems gives meaning to the Act's
premise that there must be no secret information systems,' 07 and helps
100. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(4) (Supp. V 1975).
101. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(4)(A) (Supp. V 1975). A "system of records" is de-
fined as a group of any records under the control of any agency from which information
is retrieved by the name of the individual or by some identifying number, symbol, or
other identifying particular assigned to the individual. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(5) (Supp.
V 1975) (emphasis added). The Act defines the term record as
any item, collection, or grouping of information about an individual that is
maintained by an agency, including but not limited to, his education, financial
transactions, medical history, and criminal or employment history and that
contains his name, or . . . other identifying particular assigned to the indi-
vidual. . . . 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a) (4) (Supp. V 1975).
Although the broad definition of the term "record" will preclude agencies from refusing
to comply with the Act on the pretext that an element of personal information does not
constitute a record, the term "system of records" is potentially a major loophole in
the Act. Virtually all provisions of the Privacy Act only apply to an agency if it
maintains a system of records. This is a legitimate limitation with respect to subsections
(e) (4) (publishing requirements) and (d) (access requirements). There is no justifica-
tion, however, for applying this limitation to subsections (b) (conditions of disclosure)
and (c) (accounting of disclosures). The effects of failing to apply these subsections
to an agency that does not maintain a system of records are disastrous. First, these
agencies can disclose personal information to anyone for any purpose. Second, the
individual has no control over the use of information. Finally, agencies can avoid the
Act entirely by claiming that personal records under their control do not compromise
a "system." The Act itself provides no specific guidelines to aid in the determination
of whether a group of records constitutes a system and those provided in the OMB
Guidelines are insufficient. See OMB Guidelines supra note 69, at 28,963. The
Guidelines merely admonish agencies: "systems . . . should not be subdivided or reor-
ganized so that information which would otherwise have been subject to the Act is no
longer subject to the Act."
102. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e) (4) (B) (Supp. V 1975).
103. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(4)(C) (Supp. V 1975).
104. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(4)(D) (Supp. V 1975).
105. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(4)(E)-(H) (Supp. V 1975).
106. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e) (4) (H) (Supp. V 1975).
107. See S. REP. No. 93-1183, supra note 6, at 2; H.R. REP. No. 93-1416, supra
note 54, at 4; OMB Guidelines, supra note 69, at 28,962.
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preclude a government institution like the Army from ever again main-
taining secret files on millions of law-abiding American citizens. 08 The
procedural rules also enable individuals to exercise their right to inspect
and challenge the contents of personal files, and thereby assist in
the enforcement of the Act.10 9
The procedural rules will implement effectively the goals of the Pri-
vacy Act only to the extent that the substantive restrictions on the agen-
cies are workable. To a disturbing degree, however, the substantive
rules exhibit the same flaws as those sections of the Act that recognize
individual interests. While conceptually sound, the substantive agency
restrictions will often prove pragmatically worthless.
1. Collection of New Data
Subsection (e) of the Privacy Act contains explicit restrictions on the
federal agencies' ability to gather new information. Subsection (e)
(2)11 ° recognizes the principle that the best source of accurate data
about a person is the individual himself. Thus, agencies must "collect
information to the greatest extent practicable directly from the subject
individual when the information may result in adverse determinations
about an individual's rights, benefits, and privileges under Federal pro-
grams . ...
As usual, this provision is soundly conceived. Congress properly re-
cognized that information provided by third parties is often erroneous
or biased.112 Moreover, a requirement that agencies collect infor-
mation from the subject of a record furthers the individual's interest
in knowing of the existence of files about him and limiting the govern-
ment's collection of personal data.113 The major flaw in subsection (e)
(2) is not conceptual but mechanical: the Act provides no criteria by
which agencies or courts can determine when it is "impractical" to
collect information directly from the subject. Apparently, the agencies
108. See note 16 supra.
109. See OMB Guidelines, supra note 69, at 28,962.
110. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e) (2) (Supp. V 1975).
111. Id.
112. See OMB Guidelines, supra note 69, at 28,961.
113. See 120 CONG. REc. S21,817 (daily ed. Dec. 17, 1974) ("[Ain individual should
to the greatest extent possible be in control of information about him which is given
to the government.").
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have effective discretion to decide the question themselves, 114 and the
laudable purpose of subsection (e)(2) is largely unenforceable.
Subsection (e) (1)," which limits the kind of information that
agencies may collect, is perhaps the most workable provision of the Act.
Subsection (e)(1) requires an agency to "maintain in its records only such
information about an individual as is relevant and necessary to accom-
plish a purpose of the agency required to be accomplished by statute or
by executive order of the President."" 6  Underlying this requirement
are the congressional judgments that agencies should never acquire
personal information unless necessary to the performance of a legitimate
function, and that data neither collected nor maintained cannot be mis-
used." This provision should preclude agencies from asking such
questions as those appearing on many civil service applications during
the 1960's:
I believe there is a God.
I believe in the second coming of Chirst.
I go to church almost every week.
I am very strongly attracted by members of my own sex.
I loved my father.
My sex life is satisfactory. 1" 8
Even if such inquiries were relevant to job performance, the agency
would be hard-pressed to defend their necessity in accordance with (e)
(1)."" Moreover, although the enforcement provisions of the Act are
generally weak, it may be difficult for agencies to ignore the subsection
114. See OMB 'Guidelines, supra note 69, at 28,961 (providing relevant considera.
tions); Project, supra note 12, at 1311-15 (criticizing subsection (e)(2)).
115. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(1) (Supp. V 1975).
116. Id. (emphasis added).
117. See S. REP. No. 93-1183, supra note 6, at 45; OMB Guidelines, supra note
69, at 28,960.
118. Ervin, The First Amendment: A Living Thought in the Computer Age, re.
printed in Data Bank Hearings (pt. II), supra note 11, at 1550, 1552; see S. Rep.
No. 93-1183, supra note 6, at 11.
119. The OMB Guidelines recognize necessity as a requirement and declare the fol-
lowing kinds of questions as guidelines for determining whether information is relevant
and necessary:
1) How does the information relate to the purpose (in law) for which the system
is maintained?; 2) What are the adverse consequences, if any, of not collecting the
information?; 3) Does the information have to be in individually identifiable form?;
4) How long must the information be retained?; 5) What is the financial cost of main-
taining the record compared to the risks/adverse consequences of not maintaining it?
OMB Guidelines, supra note 69, at 28,960.
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(e)(1) relevance and necessity requirement because agency collection
practices are highly visible to the public. 2 '
2. Maintenance of Files
The Privacy Act imposes several restrictions on agencies to com-
plement the recognition of the individual's interest in accurate and
timely personal records. If the Act's collection restraints are effective,
records compiled after 1974 should be substantially correct when ini-
tially compiled. A major problem confronting Congress in drafting
privacy legislation, however, was how to ensure the correction of inac-
curate, dated, or incomplete records compiled before the passage of
the statute and the continued updating of all records. 121 Congress
sought to achieve these goals in two ways. First, agencies must grant
individuals access to their records and correct information contained
therein that is erroneous or otherwise fails to comply with the Act. The
deficiencies of these provisions have been noted previously. 122  The
Act also imposes a general duty on agencies to maintain only relevant
and necessary information and a specific duty to ensure its accuracy
and timeliness before using it to make a determination about a subject.
Subsection (e)(1), discussed previously, applies to the maintenance
of new and existing agency files as well as to the collection of new
data. Agencies should review their record systems on a periodic basis
to ensure compliance with the "relevant and necessary" requirement
of subsection (e)(1).' 23  Although the rationale for this requirement
applies as strongly to existing records as it does to the acquisition of
new data, compliance in the former instance may be harder to achieve.
Because the inner workings of the agencies are hidden from public
view, pressure to update old records will be far less than pressure to
force compliance with collection regulations. Thus, the absence of an
adequate mechanism to enforce the Act will probably result in noncom-
pliance.
120. But see Project, supra note 12, at 1305-08.
121. For discussion of problems with records compiled before the Privacy Act, see
notes 18-36 supra and accompanying text.
122. See notes 81-82 supra and accompanying text.
123. See OMB Guidelines, supra note 69, at 28,961 (agencies should insure that
record systems comply with subsection (e)(1): (1) in preparing public notices, (2)
in developing new information systems, (3) upon changing a system, (4) at least an-
nually).
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The Privacy Act also imposes a specific duty on agencies to ensure
the accuracy and timeliness of information used in making determi-
nations about a subject. Subsection (e)(5) requires agencies to "main-
tain all records which are used by the agency in making any determina-
tion about any individual with such accuracy, relevance, timeliness, and
completeness as is reasonably necessary to assure fairness to the in-
dividual in the determination . *.".., Although the desirability of
accurate information in personal files should be self-evident, this section
is a substantially watered down version of the measure originally pro-
posed in the Senate. The Senate bill imposed a heavy burden on the
agencies, requiring them to ensure that information contained in a
record was accurate, relevant, timely, and complete whenever the record
was disclosed, used to make determinations about the subject, or
altered. 1.2  The compromise that emerged 126 as subsection (e)(5) of the
Privacy Act accepts the House provision and requires an agency to
assure the quality of only those records "which are used by the agency
in making any determination about an individual."'12 7 Unfortunately,
even if an agency does delete information in making a determination
about an individual, it will undoubtedly consider such data when making
the determination.12  Consequently, the stated purpose of subsection
(e)(5), fair determinations, will probably be the exception. Moreover,
subsection (e)(5) will probably fail to fulfill the broader goal of accom-
plishing the destruction or correction of the vast quantity of existing
information that violates the Privacy Act.
3. Disclosure and Dissemination
The recognition of an individual's continuing interest in government-
held data that concerns him required the imposition of restrictions on
the dissemination practices of federal agencies. The Privacy Act at-
tempts to provide such restrictions in two ways.
124. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e) (5) (Supp. V 1975).
125. See S. REP. No. 93-1183, supra note 6, at 50.
126. See 120 CONG. Rue. S21,816 (daily ed. Dec. 17, 1974).
127. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e) (5) (Supp. V 1975) (emphasis supplied).
128. Since all records except those compiled for statistical purposes, see subsection
(a) (6), may be used to make determinations, this section could be interpreted to require
agencies to insure the quality of all records but those subject to subsection (a) (6).
Cf. OMB Guidelines, supra note 69, at 28,961 (similar argument made in discussion
of subsection (e) (2)). Nevertheless, the legislative history conflicts with this interpre-
tation and its adoption is unlikely.
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First, subsection (b)' 29 requires an agency to obtain the subject's
consent before disclosing personal records. The problems of enforcing
this subsection and the exemptions that largely defeat it have been
noted."" ' The second restriction on agency dissemination is subsection
(e)(6),1:11 which requires that an agency "prior to disseminating any
record about an individual to any person other than an agency, unless
the dissemination is made pursuant to subsection (b)(2) of this section,
make reasonable efforts to assure that such records are accurate, com-
plete, timely, and relevant for agency purposes .... "132 Once again,
this subsection is conceptually sound and practically unenforceable.
Its purpose is to assure that agencies transmit only reliable informa-
tion to persons outside the federal government. Because the restric-
tions in the Privacy Act apply only to federal agencies, the subject
of a record can not gain access to, or correct errors in, records dis-
closed to persons outside the federal government. Data disseminated
to such persons should, therefore, be of the highest possible quality.133
In practice, this subsection is likely to prove unenforceable. The in-
dividual can challenge an agency's decision to ignore this provision only
by exercising his right of access under subsection (d). As noted
above, the failure to provide individuals with effective notice of
the existence of their records renders subsection (d) a useless en-
forcement device. 134  Moreover, subsection (e)(6) is inapplicable to
material disclosed under the Freedom of Information Act-probably
the largest category of disclosures made to persons "other than an
agency.' 13 5
The substantive restrictions on agency practices, therefore, parallel
almost exactly the individual interests recognized under the Privacy
Act. In each case, the inability to enforce them obviates the value of
conceptually sound approaches to protecting informational privacy.
These deficiencies, and the manifold exemptions, render the Privacy
Act little more than a legislative statement of unenforceable rights.
129. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) (Supp. V 1975).
130. See notes 84-98 supra and accompanying text.
131. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(6) (Supp. V 1975).
132. Id. (emphasis added).
133. See 120 CONG. REc. S21,816 (daily ed. Dec. 17, 1974).
134. See notes 81-82 supra and accompanying text.
135. See notes 263-66 infra and accompanying text.
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D. Civil Remedies
Subsection (g)' 36 of the Privacy Act establishes civil remedies ena-
bling individuals to seek equitable relief or damages from agencies that
violate the Act. Other than criminal penalties of very limited scope, 187
these provisions are the only means to enforce the agency restrictions
and implement the individual interests recognized in the Privacy Act.
The original Senate bill provided for an independent Privacy Commis-
sion with power to investigate, hold hearings upon, and recommend
prosecution of agency violations.' 38  The legislative compromise re-
placed this body with a purely advisory commission, 13 9 leaving sole re-
sponsibility for enforcing the Act to individual citizens. Unfortunately,
subsection (g) provides neither the tools nor the incentives necessary
to make individual enforcement a reality.
Subsection (g) permits equitable relief in two situations. If the
agency disregards the access provisions of subsection (d),140 the indi-
vidual may seek injunctive relief to force the agency to let him inspect
his records.141 If the agency refuses to amend a record upon request,
or fails to review the individual's request for amendment as provided
in subsection (d)(3), 42 the victim may also seek a court order com-
pelling the agency to amend the record. 43 In both cases, the courts
must determine the matter de novo and are empowered to award costs
and attorney's fees to a substantially successful plaintiff. 44
In addition, an individual may seek damages from an agency that
fails to maintain any record concerning any individual with such accu-
racy, relevance, timeliness, and completeness as is necessary to assure
fairness in any determination relating to the qualifications, character,
rights, or opportunities of, or benefits to the individual that may be
136. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g) (Supp. V 1975).
137. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(i) (Supp. V 1975).
138. See S. REP. No. 93-1183, supra note 6, at 23-24. The Senate Committee con-
cluded an independent commission was essential to enforcement of the Act.
139. Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, § 5, 88 Stat. 1896.
140. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1)(B) (Supp. V 1975).
141. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(3)(A) (Supp. V 1975).
142. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1)(A) (Supp. V 1975).
143. 5 U.S.C. §§552a(g)(2)(A), (g)(3)(A) (Supp. V 1975). The only apparent
difference between suits brought under these subsections is that under (g)(2)(A) the
individual has the burden of proving that the agency wrongfully refused to amend a
record while under (g)(3)(A) the agency must justify its refusal to grant access to
the subject of a record. See OMB Guidelines, supra note 69, at 28,969.
144. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g) (2) (B) (Supp. V 1975).
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made on the basis of such record, and consequently a determination is
made which is adverse to the individual ;14 5 or fails to comply with any
other provision of this section, or any rule promulgated thereunder, in
such a way as do [sic] have an adverse effect on an individual. 146
Damages are only recoverable, however, if the agency acted "in a man-
ner which was intentional or willful,"' 47 in which case the indi-
vidual is entitled to an award of actual damages or $1000, which-
ever is greater,4 s plus his costs and reasonable attorney's fees. 49
Punitive damages are not recoverable. To obtain any relief, plaintiff
must normally file suit within two years after the violation occurs. 50
It is unrealistic to expect these remedial provisions to provide ade-
quate incentives for individuals to seek redress under the Act. First,
the Act imposes an unreasonably heavy burden on the plaintiff. He
must allege and prove that he has suffered an adverse determination
in consequence of the agency's violation of the Act, and that the agency
acted willfully or intentionally. Most plaintiffs will fail to meet these
burdens. The most prevalent threats to privacy stem not from inten-
tional action but from "inadvertent, careless, and unthinking collection,
distribution, and storage of records.' ' 15l Requiring proof of willful mis-
behavior assures that most abuses will go uncorrected. The require-
ment that the plaintiff must have suffered an adverse determination in
145. 5 U.S.C. , 552a(g)(1)(C) (Supp. V 1975) (emphasis added). The Guide-
lines define an ad.erse determination as -one resulting in the denial of a right, benefit,
entitlement, or employment by an agency which the individual could reasonably have
expected to have been given if the record had not been deficient." OMB Guidelines,
supra note 69, at 28,969.
146. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1)(D) (Supp. V 1975).
147. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g) (4) (Supp. V 1975). "On a continuum between negligence
and the very high standard of willful, arbitrary, or capricious conduct, this standard
is viewed as only somewhat greater than gross negligence." 120 CONG. REc. S21,817
(daily ed. Dec. 17, 1974).
148. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(4) (A) (Supp. V 1975).
149. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(4)(B) (Supp. V 1975). Unlike (g)(2) and (g)(3),
which make the award of court costs and attorneys' fees discretionary, under (g) (4)
costs and attorneys' fees are mandatory when an agency is adjudged liable. See OMB
Guidelines, supra note 69, at 76.
150. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(5) (Supp. V 1975). The Act contains an exception to
this requirement when
an agency has materially and willfully misrepresented any information required
, " .to be disclosed to an individual and the information so misrepresented is
material to establishment of the liability of the agency to the individual ...
the action may be brought at any time within two years after discovery by the
individual of the misrepresentation. (emphasis added).
,I. S. REP. No. 93-1183, supra note 6, at 24.
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order to recover is also unfortunate. Many agency violations will not
result in determinations or cause measurable injury, further isolating
agency abuse from corrective action.
Second, -the Act provides insufficient recovery to stimulate private
suits. Even if the plaintiff can prove actual injury, the damage
award may be small. The Act's failure to provide for punitive damages
virtually guarantees that the financial risks of the litigation will often
exceed the rewards of the suit. The $1000 guarantee is a meager in-
centive to risk the expense of suing the federal government. 1 2  The
Act thus fails to provide the adequate level of damages essential to ef-
fective citizen enforcement.
Finally, the two-year statute of limitations is unreasonable. Because
agencies need not notify individuals when making adverse determi-
nations based on personal records,'0 3 many individuals aggrieved by
agency violations will not learn the cause of their injury until after the
statute of limitations has run.
The enforcement scheme in the original Senate bill was far superior
to that in the Act as passed. A strong Privacy Commission was ex-
pected to share responsibility for enforcing the Act.154 The original
Senate bill imposed liability for negligent as well as willful violations,15
and authorized recovery of punitive damages where appropriate. 150
152. See Project, supra note 12, at 1330: 'The floor on recovery . . .presumably
represents a compromise between the House proposal, which only allowed recovery of
actual damages, and the Senate proposal, which allowed recovery of punitive damages
where appropriate." (footnotes omitted).
153. See note 150 supra and accompanying text.
154. The Senate bill provided for an independent privacy commission responsible
for: 1) monitoring and inspecting new information systems, 2) compiling a directory
of information systems to enable individuals to take advantage of rights granted under
the Act, and 3) investigating and holding hearings upon violations of the Act. See
S. REP. No. 93-1183, supra note 60, at 23-24.
155. See S. 3418, § 303(c), 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). ("Any person who violates
the provisions of this Act ...shall be liable to any person aggrieved thereby in an
amount equal to the sum of-(1) any actual damages ... (2) punitive damages
where appropriate. . ."). See also 120 CONG. REc. S21,817 (daily ed. Dec. 17, 1974).
Additionally, the Senate bill obligated the Attorney General to "challenge in court any
violation of the Act which might affect the public at large, but which does not yet
affect any particular citizen sufficiently . . . to induce a private person to endure the
practical difficulties of litigation." S. REP. No. 93-1183, supra note 6, at 83. The
omission of this crucial provision was inexcusable, particularly in light of the failure
to allow punitive damages.
156. See text accompanying notes 135-36 supra.
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Substitution of the House provisions in the final Act has once again re-
duced the Privacy Act to a legislative statement of unenforceable rights.
IV. THE PRIVACY ACT AND THE SOCIAL NEED
FOR INFORMATION
The first two goals of the Privacy Act-recognizing the continuing
individual interest in government-held data, and restricting the infor-
mation practices of federal agencies-are essentially compatible. As
the original Senate bill demonstrates, drafting a statute that accom-
plishes these goals would have been a relatively easy task. The Act's
third goal-striking an appropriate balance between the individual pri-
vacy interest and the legitimate social needs for information-is far
more difficult to achieve. Resolving the conflict between these essen-
tially incompatible interests requires a thorough understanding of each,
and a well defined sense of their relative importance. The most for-
midable task facing Congress in drafting the Privacy Act, therefore, was
the accommodation of individual privacy with such interests as adminis-
trative efficiency, effective law enforcement, and the public's right to
know.
Unfortunately, those sections of the Privacy Act that consider other
social interests are among the most ill-conceived sections of the Act.
In virtually every instance when privacy conflicted with other legitimate
objectives, Congress merely chose to sacrifice privacy. In protecting
the two most important social interests--effective law enforcement and
the public's right to know-the complete sacrifice of privacy signifi-
cantly frustrates the operation of the Act. Moreover, in each instance,
it is apparent that privacy need not have been wholly subordinated to
the other interest: Congress could have struck a better balance. Exam-
ination of the interaction between the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA)"'7 and the Privacy Act, and of the law enforcement exemp-
tions to the latter, illustrates this thesis.
A. The Law Enforcement Exemptions
The social interest in enforcing the criminal law is clear. Equally
obvious is the occasional sacrifice of individual liberties that effective
law enforcement requires. During the last decade, however, agencies
such as the FBI and the CIA perpetrated some of the most insidious in-
157. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970).
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vasions of privacy in the name of "law and order." Curbing abusive
practices by law enforcement agencies without seriously impairing their
legitimate functions is a difficult task for any statute. One of the most
disturbing aspects of the Privacy Act is its failure to evidence even an
attempt to accomplish this goal.
Subsections (j)18 and (k)y'" permit an agency to exempt certain
types of record systems from many crucial provisions of the Act. Al-
though no record system is automatically exempt, the head of an agency
can easily obtain an exemption by determining that a system qualifies
for exemption under subsection (j) or (k) and filing an appropriate
notice in the Federal Register.'60
Subsection (j) grants a blanket exemption to all record systems
maintained by the CIA.' 6" Other agencies or sub-agencies whose prin-
cipal function pertains to the enforcement of criminal laws may exempt
a system of records if it consists of one of three specific kinds of data.' 62
Although subsection (j) enumerates ten sections to which the exemp-
tion is supposedly inapplicable, in practice the subsection grants immu-
nity from almost every significant restriction in the Act. 08 For exam-
ple, subsection (j) does not allow an exemption from the notice and
consent provisions of subsection (b).' 64 Under subsection (b)(7),
however, any law enforcement agency of any governmental unit can ac-
quire personal records without either notice to, or consent by, the sub-
ject, if the agency head requests the records in writing and certifies that
they will be used for law enforcement purposes. 66 Similarly, although
law enforcement agencies are not exempt from subsections (c)(1) and
(c)(2), requiring an accounting of all disclosures, 60 subsection (c)(4)
relieves agencies of the duty to make accountings of (b) (7) disclosures
158. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(j) (Supp. V 1975).
159. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(k) (Supp. V 1975).
160. See OMB Guidelines, supra note 69, at 28,971-72.
161. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(i)(1) (Supp. V 1975).
162. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(j) (2) (Supp. V 1975). Specifically, to qualify for exemp-
tion under subsection (j) (2), a record system must consist of information: a) compiled
for the purpose of identifying suspects and offenders and which consists only of identify-
ing data, e.g., rap sheets; b) information compiled as part of a criminal investigation; or
c) identifiable records compiled at any stage of the law enforcement process.
163. Subsection (j) does not exempt records from the requirements of subsections
(b), (c)(1) and (2), (e)(4)(A)-(F), (e)(6), (7), (9), (10) and (11) and (i).
5 U.S.C. § 552a(j) (Supp. V 1975).
164. See note 84 supra and accompanying text.
165. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) (7) (Supp. V 1975).
166. See note 85 supra and accompanying text.
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available to the subject on request. 167  Finally, although these agencies
cannot, under subsection (j), escape the ban on collecting information
about the exercise of first amendment rights,'- 8 subsection (e)(7) ex-
plicitly permits collection of such data if "pertinent to and within the
scope of an authorized law enforcement activity."'169
The only substantive restrictions from which law enforcement agen-
cies can never gain immunity require them to exercise reasonable ef-
forts to assure the reliability of, and obtain the individual's consent be-
fore disclosing, personal files to persons other than law enforcement
agencies.""0 Neither provision is meaningful. The exceptions to the
consent requirement of subsection (b) virtually nullify the rule.' 7' The
reliability restriction of subsection (e)(6) is wholly unenforceable
against law enforcement agencies because subsection (j) permits ex-
emption from the civil remedies provisions, and violation of this re-
quirement would not constitute grounds for criminal prosecution.172
Subsection (k) enables an agency to exempt seven different types
of records from various provisions of the Act.173 These exemptions
are not limited to record systems maintained by law enforcement agen-
cies, 174 but they are not as extensive as those allowed under subsection
(j). Subsection (k)(2), available to law enforcement records not
covered by subsection (j), permits an agency to exempt
investigatory material compiled for law enforcement purposes, other
than material within the scope of Subsection (j) (2) . . . Provided,
however, That if any individual is denied any right, privilege, or benefit
that he would otherwise be entitled by Federal law, or for which he
would otherwise be eligible, as a result of the maintenance of such ma-
terial, such material shall be provided to such individual, except to the
extent that the disclosure of such material would reveal the identity of a
source who furnished information to the Government under an express
promise [of confidentiality], or, prior to the effective date of this [Act],
under an implied promise [of confidentiality]. 175
167. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(c)(3) (Supp. V 1975).
168. See note 167 supra and accompanying text.
169. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(7) (Supp. V 1975).
170. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(6)& (b) (Supp. V 1975).
171. See note 169 supra.
172. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(i) (Supp. V 1975) (restricting criminal penalties to viola-
tions of disclosure or notice provisions).
173. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(k) (Supp. V 1975); OMB Guidelines, supra note 69,
at 28,972-74.
174. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(k)(1)-(7) (Supp. V 1975).
175. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(k) (2) (Supp. V 1975).
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Virtually every law enforcement record qualifies for an exemption
under either subsection (j) or (k)(2)..7  Although the statutory lan-
guage suggests otherwise, there are but two significant distinctions be-
tween the exemptions available under these two subsections.177 First,
while an agency relying on subsection (k)(2) must ordinarily provide
damaging information to an individual adversely affected by its use,178
subsection (j) contains no such requirement. The second important
distinction is that only subsection (j) exempts agencies from the civil
remedies provisions of subsection (g).17 9
From the broad immunity conferred upon law enforcement agencies
flows the unfortunate conclusion that Congress apparently believed le-
gitimate law enforcement needs should always take priority over any
individual privacy interest. The only legitimate grounds for exempting
law enforcement records, however, are the need to protect the secrecy
of a pending investigation, the safety of undercover agents, and the se-
crecy of certain investigative techniques.1 80 None of these reasons jus-
tifies providing agencies wholesale immunity from the individual access
176. See Project, supra note 12, at 1332-36.
177. The remaining differences between subsections (j) and (k) are either unneces-
sary or unwarranted, and pragmatically insignificant. Subsection (j) allows an exemp-
tion from subsection (e) (2) (requiring agencies to collect information directly from
subject to the "greatest extent practicable," see notes 110-11 supra and accom-
panying text), while subsection (k)(2) does not. This difference is meaning-
less because in criminal investigations it will obviously be impracticable to obtain most
information from a suspect. Subsection (k) (2), unlike subsection (j), does not permit
exemption from the requirements of subsection (e)(3), requiring agencies to inform
the subject of the purpose and authority for requests for information. See notes 62-
63 supra. This difference is also meaningless because most law enforcement agencies
acquire information about a suspect from third parties, and subsection (e)(3) does not
apply to requests made of third parties. See Project, supra note 12, at 1310.
The final distinction between subsections (j) and (k) (2) is that only the former
permits an agency to ignore the requirements of subsection (e) (5) requiring agencies
to insure the quality of records used in making determinations. See note 124 supra
and accompanying text. This exemption is not only unwarranted, it is unnecessary
given the discretion allowed law enforcement agencies elsewhere in the Act regarding
the kinds of information they may acquire.
178. The legislative history emphasizes that courts should construe narrowly the ex-
ception that permits withholding information to protect the confidentiality of sources.
Additionally, the Guidelines direct agencies to make express promises of confidentiality
sparingly and to inform other sources that their identities may be disclosed. See 120
CoNo. Ruc. S21,816 (daily ed. Dec. 17, 1974); OMB Guidelines, supra note 69, at
28,973.
179. See notes 135-44 supra and accompanying text.
180. See note 217 infra and accompanying text (discussing FOIA exemption).
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and challenge provisions or from civil liability.' 3 ' Subsection (j)
should include the caveat contained in subsection (k) (2) ,182 modified
only as necessary to protect the legitimate government interests out-
lined above. Finally, it is astonishing to note that an individual is more
likely to acquire his personal record from a law enforcement agency
by means of an FOIA suit than by one brought under the Privacy
Act."' : A rational statutory scheme would surely recognize that the
subject of a personal record has a greater interest in it than does the
general public; the Privacy Act does not. Although an agency cannot
withhold information from an individual based on a Privacy Act
exemption when the FOIA requires disclosure,' the approach taken
in the Privacy Act is extremely disturbing. It strongly suggests
that Congress intended to protect privacy only when it conflicted with
no other legitimate social interests. Because privacy conflicts with
other interests more often than not, such an approach guarantees little
protection to individual privacy.
The conclusion is inescapable that Congress refused to analyze in
depth the conflict between privacy and law enforcement. Instead,
whenever it perceived a conflict, Congress sacrificed the privacy inter-
est without considering whether the marginal benefit to law enforce-
ment exceeded the marginal cost to privacy. Consequently, the Pri-
181. See H.R. REP. No. 93-1416, supra note 54, at 37-39 (additional views of Reps.
Abzug, Moss, Stanton, Gude, Burton, Fasell, Culver, Collins, Rosenthal, Conyers, Jr.):
By narrowing the exemption categories and defining them in specific
terms related to the use of records rather than to the agency maintaining them,
Congress could provide agency heads with standards to meet in exercising
their . . . authority to grant exemptions. Only in this way can we be assured
that the Constitutional rights of individuals will be protected and will not be
sacrificed to administrative discretion, expendiency or whim.
See also 120 CONG. REc. H12,248 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1974) (remarks of Representative
Koch). The failure to limit the exemptions for law enforcement agencies to active
criminal investigations is unfortunate, particularly in light of experience under the sev-
enth exemption to the FOIA prior to the 1974 amendments. See notes 219-22 infra
and accompanying text.
182. See text accompanying note 175 supra.
183. The exemptions to the Privacy Act would often permit an agency to withhold
a record from the subject where the FOIA would require disclosure. In these situations,
"the Privacy Act should not be used to deny access to information about an individual
which would otherwise have been required to be disclosed to that individual under the
Freedom of Information Act." Office of Management and Budget, Implementation of
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vacy Act needlessly excludes a principal enemy of individual privacy,
law enforcement agencies, from its substantive restrictions.
B. Privacy and the Public's Right to Know
The public's right to know is, almost by definition, the antithesis of
the individual's right to privacy.""; The individual's interest in restrict-
ing disclosure of personal facts is almost directly opposed to the public
interest in expanding public knowledge to ensure informed, democratic
decision-making. Although the right to know may have constitutional
foundations, 88 since 1966 its most significant legal base has been the
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).187
Material disclosed to the public under the FOIA is largely exempt
from the Privacy Act. Subsection (b), requiring agencies to notify and
obtain the consent of the subject of a personal record before releasing
it, 8  is expressly inapplicable to material whose disclosure is required
by the FOIA. 89 Under subsection (c)(1) agencies need not keep an
accounting of the release of such materials.190 Finally, subsection (e)
(6), requiring agencies to make reasonable efforts to ensure the relia-
bility of records released to persons other than an agency, does not
apply when the FOIA requires disclosure. 1'
Congress obviously chose to subordinate the Privacy Act to the FOIA
whenever it perceived a potential conflict between the interests pro-
tected by each Act. Because several provisions of the FOIA purport to
safeguard privacy, Congress may have assumed that the FOIA had
struck an appropriate balance between personal privacy and the right to
know. Closer inspection of the FOLA, however, reveals that for two
reasons, the Act as presently interpreted cannot protect individual pri-
vacy. First, courts interpreting the FOTA exemptions have almost com-
pletely ignored privacy interests. More fundamentally, because only
the agency can invoke an exemption, the FOIA places the responsibil-
185. See Emerson, Legal Foundations of the Right to Know, 1976 WAsH. U.L.Q.
1, 20.
186. For discussion of the constitutional dimensions of the right to know, see Emer-
son, supra note 185.
187. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970).
188. See note 84 supra and accompanying text.
189. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(2) (Supp. V 1975).
190. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(c) (1) (Supp. V 1975).
191. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(6) (Supp. V 1975).
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ity of protecting individual privacy in the wrong hands-with the
agency rather than the individual.
1. The FOIA Exemptions
A brief explanation of the operation of the FOIA is necessary to un-
derstand its inability to protect individual privacy. The FOIA directs
federal agencies to release identifiable records to "any person" on re-
quest.""' If the agency fails to comply, the individual may seek injunc-
tive relief from the federal courts.1 93 The agency bears the burden
of justifying its action; unless one of nine specifically defined exemp-
tions applies, the citizen must prevail.' 4 The FOIA was intended to
achieve maximum public access to government records' 95 in order to
develop an informed electorate capable of wisely selecting and moni-
toring the government!"9 In recognition of this basic purpose, courts
have narrowly interpreted the exemptions.1 97
192. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1970).
193. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B)(Supp. IV 1974).
194. 5 U.S.C. § 552(c) (1970).
195. See, e.g., Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 360-61 (1976);
EPA v, Mink, 410 U.S. 73. 80 (1973); Bristol-Meyers Co. v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935, 938
(D.C. Cir. ), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824 (1970). For a general review of the FOIA, see
Note. The Fieedom of Information Act: A Seven Year Assessment, 74 COLUM. L.
REv. 895 (1974). See also EPA v. Mink, supra; Department of the Air Force v. Rose,
supra; Note, The Freedom of Information Act and Equitable Discretion, 51 DEN. L.
263 (1974); Note, The Investigatory Files Exemption to the FOIA: The D.C. Circuit
Abandonv Bristol-Meyers, 42 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 869 (1974); 40 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
527, 527-29 (1970).
196. See, e.g., Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1080 (D.C. Cir. 1971); H.R. REP.
No. 89-1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1966) ("A democratic society requires an in-
formed, intelligent electorate, and the intelligence of the electorate varies as the quantity
and quality of its information varies.").
197. See, e.g., Ditlow v. Shultz, 517 F.2d 166 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Rose v. Department
of the Air Force, 495 F.2d 261, 263 (2d Cir. 1974), afd, 425 U.S. 352 (1976); Vaughn
v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 823 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 997 (1974);
Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Wellford v. Hardin, 444 F.2d 21,
24 (4th Cir. 1971); Bristol-Meyers Co. v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935, 938 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 824 (1970); M.A. Schapiro & Co. v. SEC, 339 F. Supp. 467 (D.D.C.
1972); Note, Access to Broadcasters' Financial Statements Filed with the FCC, The
Freedom of Information Act Alternative, 42 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 145, 155-56 (1973);
Note, The Plain Meaning of the Freedom of Information Act: NLRB v. Getman, 47
IND. LJ. 530, 543 (1972); Note, Public Disclosure of Internal Revenue Service Private
Letter Rulings, 40 U. Cm. L. RIv. 832, 844-55; 45 IND. L.. 421.
Courts and commentators agree that the FOIA is a poorly drafted statute. See, e.g.,
Epstein v. Resor, 421 F.2d 930, 932 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970);
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Three exemptions to the FOIA are relevant to personal privacy in-
terests. Exemption four permits agencies to withhold "trade secrets
and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and
privileged or confidential."'' l9 Although the statutory language and the
legislative history support the application of this exemption to all types
of confidential information, 9 courts now agree that exemption four
protects only privileged or confidential information which is commercial
in nature.200 Information is confidential for purposes of exemption
four only if its disclosure would injure either the government's ability to
obtain information in the future or the competitive position of the party
supplying the information.201
Davis, The Information Act: A Preliminary Analysis, 34 U. Cm. L. REv. 761 (1967);
Note, The Freedom of Information Act, The Parameters of the Exemptions, 62 GEO.
L.J. 177 (1973). The statutory language is vague, confusing, and inconsistent with
the House and Senate Reports, which in turn, conflict with each other. See Davis,
supra, at 762-63; Note, The Investigatory Files Exemption to the FOIA: The D.C. Cir-
cuit Abandons Bristol-Meyers, 42 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 869, 872-75 (1974); Note, The
Freedom of Information Act: A Critical Review, 38 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 150, 150-58
(1969); Note, Public Disclosure of Internal Revenue Service Private Letter Rulings,
40 U. Cm. L. Rnv. 832, 83942 (1973). The House Report and the Attorney General's
Memorandum, which generally follows it, see UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM ON THE PUBLIC INFORMATION SECTION OF THE AD-
M uNs TivE PROCEDURE ACT 111 (1967) [hereinafter cited as ATro Nny GENERAL'S
MEMORANDUJM] frequently give priority to the interests of privacy and confidentiality
at the expense of disclosure. They conflict with the Senate Report, which emphasizes
the Act's goal of providing for broad disclosure. In an attempt to further what they
view as the purpose of the FOIA, courts interpreting the Act have ignored the House
Report and the Attorney General's Memorandum.
198. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (4) (1970).
199. The House and Senate Reports explicitly state that the fourth exemption protects
confidential information that is neither commercial nor financial. See S. REP. No. 89-
813, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1965); H.R. REP. No. 89-1497, supra note 196, at 10.
Courts have disregarded the legislative history because it was drawn from an earlier
version of the bill that explicitly protected noncommercial information. See Brockway
v. Department of the Air Force, 518 F.2d 1184 (8th Cir. 1975). Professor Davis sadly
concludes that the legislative history is inadequate support for the proposition that
confidential noncommercial information may be exempt. He insists that courts should
go outside the Act to protect confidential information. See Davis, supra note 197, at
788-92.
200. See National Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765, 770 (D.C.
Cir. 1974) (leading case). See also Continental Oil Co. v. FPC, 519 F.2d 31, 35
(5th Cir. 1975); Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 673 (D.C. Cir. 1971); 88 HARv.
L. REv. 470 (1974). For discussion of various possible interpretations of the fourth
exemption, see ATrou'Y GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM, supra note 197, at 32; Davis, supra
note 197, at 787 (criticizing Attorney General).
201. See National Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765, 770 (D.C.
Cir. 1974).
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The rationale for this interpretation is instructive. Courts have re-
stricted the coverage of exemption four in order to further the per-
ceived goal of the FOIA: maximum disclosure of public records. They
have failed to recognize that maximum disclosure was merely a means
to accomplish the FOIA's ultimate goal-governmental accounta-
bility. 0 2  While the two will often be synonymous, courts have failed
to recognize that disclosing confidential noncommercial information
could seriously injure privacy interests without contributing signifi-
cantly to the public interest in government accountability. In short,
they have failed to distinguish between different types of government-
held information. -03  If there is to be an intelligent compromise be-
tween the interests of personal privacy and public knowledge, however,
such distinctions are critical. In light of the Privacy Act, one can plau-
sibly argue for reinterpretation of this exemption on the ground that
its disclosure impedes the policies underlying the Privacy Act without
furthering those of the FOIA.204
Exemption six permits the withholding of "personnel and medical files
and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly un-
warranted invasion of personal privacy. '205 The most significant ques-
tion to arise under this exemption concerns the standard by which a
court should determine when disclosure would produce a "clearly un-
warranted invasion of personal privacy." Several courts have held that
subsection (a)(3), requiring agencies to release information to "any
person, precludes any balancing of the consequences of disclos-
202. See HEW REPORT, supra note 1, at 64-65. The FOIA amended the original
Public Information Section of the Administrative Procedure Act, Act of June 11, 1946,
ch. 324, § 3, 60 Stat. 238, under which an agency could withhold records if the informa-
tion were "required for good cause to be held confidential," or if the requesting individual
were not "properly and directly concerned." Id.
By simply labeling information exempt, agencies converted this section from a disclos-
ure provision into a withholding act. See, e.g., EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 79 (1973);
H.R. REP. No. 89-1497, supra note 196, at 4; S. REP. No. 89-813, supra note 199, at 3.
In order to eliminate such agency abuse and insure government accountability, the
FOIA established a presumption in favor of disclosure to "any person."
203. See Comment, The Freedom of Information Act's Privacy Exemptions and the
Privacy Act of 1974, 11 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 596 (1976).
204. For discussion of the possible impact of the Privacy Act upon interpretation
of the FOIA, see notes 253-54 infra and accompanying text.
205. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1970) (emphasis added).
206. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1970).
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ure.20 7 Several other courts, while agreeing that the Act ordinarily pro-
hibits balancing, insist that the sixth exemption requires an exemp-
tion. °s These courts hold that the words "clearly unwarranted invasion
of privacy" leave no alternative to weighing the public benefit of dis-
closure against the private injury from invasion of privacy.
Both of these positions have problems. The requirement that agen-
cies release information to "any person" was an unfortunate product of
congressional frustration with agencies who abused the original disclo-
sure section of the Administrative Procedure Act by withholding infor-
mation under the pretext that the requesting party "was not properly
concerned." In many instances, however, the standing of the party
seeking information is a relevant consideration. As the Privacy Act
demonstrates, the subject of a record clearly has a greater interest in
examining it than does the general public. Moreover, it is impossible
to determine if a given disclosure will produce an unwarranted invasion
of personal privacy without considering what the requesting party in-
tends to do with the information-i.e., his need. Strict adherence to the
"any person" requirement and failure to consider the interests of the
requesting party preclude sensible resolution of problems arising under
the sixth exemption. The recent Supreme Court decision in Depart-
ment of the Air Force v. Rose2"0 has evidently settled the basic issue.
The Court held that Congress adopted the exemptions to "require a bal-
ancing of the individual's right of privacy against the preservation of
the basic purpose of the Freedom of Information Act---'to open agency
action to the light of public scrutiny.' 210
The balancing approach, however, suffers from its own deficiencies.
As courts and commentators noted before Rose, this approach may pro-
207. See Robles v. EPA, 484 F.2d 843, 847 (4th Cir. 1973). See also Project, supra
note 12, at 1080-85; 40 G~o. WASH. L. REV. 527, 535-36 (1972).
208. See Wine Hobby USA, Inc. v. IRS, 502 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1974); Rural Housing
Alliance v. United States Dep't. of Agriculture, 498 F.2d 73, 78 (D.C. Cir. 1974);
Rabbitt v. Department of the Air Force, 383 F. Supp. 1065, 1070 (S.D.N.Y.). See
also Note, The Plain Meaning of the Freedom of Information Act: NLRB v. Getman,
supra note 197, at 530. See Davis, supra note 197, at 806:
This policy choice reflects pressure from the press that the public as a whole
has a right to know and does not reflect a thoughtful rejection of the balancing
approach that has been a part of all judge made law. When the time comes
for further legislation, I think this policy choice might well be re-examined.
See also note 202 supra.
209. 425 U.S. 352 (1976).
210. Id. at 372.
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duce perverse results. When little or no public benefit will result from
disclosure, balancing mandates disclosure in the absence of a serious
invasion of privacy. Similarly, when the anticipated benefit is signifi-
cant, this approach would require disclosure even if it would unwarrant-
ably invade personal privacy.21'
The correct approach to interpreting the sixth exemption would re-
quire courts to consider the needs of the FOIA plaintiff solely for the
purpose of determining the most likely effect of disclosure on the sub-
ject. If disclosure would produce a significant invasion of privacy, the
exemption should attach in all cases except those involving high public
officials, 12 in which case the strong public interest in disclosure would
seem to leave courts no alternative to balancing interests.
Exemption seven was one of two exemptions amended in 1974.213
In its original form, the seventh exemption permitted agencies to with-
hold "investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes except
to the extent available by law to a party other than an agency."2 4
Courts uniformly held this exemption applicable to investigatory files
compiled for civil as well as criminal law enforcement purposes.21
The 1974 amendment was designed to overrule a series of deci-
sions by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia that permit-
ted the indefinite withholding of law enforcement files despite the ab-
sence of any legitimate purpose. 216  The seventh exemption now
shields from disclosure
211. See sources cited note 207 supra.
212. For another feasible solution, see Comment, supra note 203, at 619-24.
213. The other exemption amended in 1974 was subsection (b) (1), pertaining to
national security.
214. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (7) (1970) (amended 1974).
215. See, e.g., Center for Nat'l Policy Review on Race & Urban Issues v. Wein-
berger, 502 F.2d 370, 373 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Aspin v. Department of Defense, 491
F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Cooney v. Sun Shipbuilding & Drydock Co., 288 F. Supp.
708 (E.D. Pa. 1968); Clement Bros. Co. v. NLRB, 282 F. Supp. 540 (N.D. Ga. 1968).
216. Prior to the 1974 amendments, courts split sharply over whether an agency
attempting to invoke exemption seven was required to demonstrate that proceedings
based upon requasted investigatory files were either pending or reasonably likely in the
near future. Courts deciding most of the early cases under the seventh exemption de-
manded such a showing. See, e.g., Wellford v. Hardin, 444 F.2d 21 (4th Cir. 1971);
Bristol-Meyers Co. v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935, 938 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824
(1970) (government may not label all files investigatory on the possibility that proceed-
ings may be launched in future-possibility must be concrete); M.A. Schapiro & Co.
v. SEC, 339 F. Supp. 467 (D.D.C. 1972); Frankel v. SEC, 336 F. Supp. 675 (S.D.N.Y.
1971), rev'd on other grounds, 460 F.2d 813 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 889
Vol. 1976:667] 705
Washington University Open Scholarship
706 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 1976:667
investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only
to the extent that the production of such records would (A) interfere
with enforcement proceedings, (B) deprive a person of a right to a fair
trial or an impartial adjudication, (C) constitute an unwarranted in-
vasion of personal privacy, (D) disclose the identity of a confidential
source and, in the case of a record compiled by a criminal lav enforce-
ment authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency
conducting a lawful national security investigation, confidential infor-
mation furnished only by the confidential source, (E) disclose investi-
gative techniques and procedures, or (F) endanger the life or safety of
law enforcement personnel.2 17
The amendment narrows the exemption by requiring proof that dis-
closure would interfere with either pending or imminent law enforce-
ment proceedings. The addition of subsection (b) (7) (c), protecting
personal privacy, however, constitutes a significant expansion of the ex-
emption.11 8 Before the 1974 amendments, courts interpreting exemp-
tion seven generally found that the exemption was designed exclusively
to protect the government's case in court and preserve the secrecy of
(1972). See also Note, The Investigatory Files Exemption, supra note 86; 1974 WASH.
U.L.Q. 463. The 1973 decisions by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia,
however, held that once the court determined that an investigatory file had been com-
piled for law enforcement purposes its task was completed. The exemption attached
indefinitely, and the unlikelihood or impossibility of future proceedings was immaterial.
Center for Nat'l Policy Review on Race & Urban Issues v. Weinberger, 502 F.2d 370
(D.C. Cir. 1974); Rural Housing Alliance v. Department of Agriculture, 498 F.2d 73
(D.C. Cir. 1974); Ditlow v. Brinegar, 494 F.2d 1073 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Aspin v. De-
partment of Defense, 491 F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Weisberg v. Department of Justice,
489 F.2d 1195 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en bane), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 993 (1974). See
also Evans v. Department of Transp., 446 F.2d 821 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405
U.S. 918 (1972); Koch v. Department of Justice, 376 F. Supp. 313, 315 (D.D.C. 1974);
Cowles Communications, Inc. v. Department of Justice, 325 F. Supp. 726 (N.D. Cal.
1971).
These decisions permitted the indefinite withholding of governmental information
when no legitimate purpose was served. For discussion of the District of 'Columbia Cir-
cuit opinions, see Clark, Holding Government Accountable: The Amended Freedom of
Information Act, 84 YALE L.J. 741, 761-63 (1975); Note, The Investigatory Files Ex-
emption to the FOIA: The D.C. Circuit Abandons Bristol-Meyers, supra note 195. The
legislative history clearly reveals a congressional intent to overrule these decisions. See
120 CoNG. RiEc. S9336 (daily ed. May 30, 1974):
(Mr. Kennedy) Does the amendment in effect override the court decisions in
the court of appeals on Weisberg against the United States; Aspin against De-
partment of Defense; Ditlow against Brinegar; and National Center against
Weisberger?
(Mr. Hart) .. . That is its purpose.
217. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (7) (Supp. V 1975) (emphasis added).
218. See Clark, supra note 216, at 762-63.
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investigative techniques.2'0 The privacy of the subjects of investiga-
tions was completely ignored. 220 Yet the individual privacy interest is
far from trivial. Law enforcement agencies have great freedom to de-
cide whom to investigate; public disclosure of investigatory files about
an individual may produce unwarranted public humiliation, 221 particu-
larly when no further proceedings, against him are contemplated. In
these instances, disclosure would often constitute the de facto convic-
tion of an individual who, for one reason or another, could not be prose-
cuted in a court of law. The earlier decisions by the District of Colum-
bia Circuit allowing the indefinite withholding of files for purely gov-
ernmental reasons inadvertently protected the individual against such
disclosures.22
The requirement of an "unwarranted invasion of personal privacy"
under amended exemption seven is no clearer than that of a "clearly
unwarranted" invasion under exemption six. 22 3  Presumably, courts
would apply similar criteria for each exemption. Whether the criteria
219. Courts generally held that the seventh exemption was designed exclusively to
protect governmental interests. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. GSA, 384 F. Supp. 996,
1004 (D.D.C. 1974) ("exemption (b)(7) is clearly designed to protect interests of the
government only."). See also Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc. v. I.T.O. Corp., 508 F.2d
945 (4th Cir. 1974); Weisberg v. Department of Justice, 489 F.2d 1195, 1199 (D.C.
Cir. 1973); Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 673 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Wellford v. Hardin,
444 F.2d 21, 23-24 (4th Cir. 1971); Legal Aid Soc'y v. Shultz, 349 F. Supp. 771,
777 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Katz, The Games Bureaucrats Play: Hide and Seek Under the
Freedom of Information Act, 48 TEx. L. Rv. 1261, 1277 (1970).
220. For example, several courts held exemption seven inapplicable if an individual
were aware of the contents of a file since no harm to the government would result
from disclosure. See Wellford v. Hardin, 444 F.2d 21, 24 (4th Cir. 1971); Sears, Roe-
buck & Co. v. GSA, 384 F. Supp. 996, 1004 (D.D.C. 1974); Ditlow v. Volpe, 362
F. Supp. 1321, 1325 (D.D.C. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 494 F.2d 1073 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 974 (1974); Legal Aid Soc'y v. Shultz, 349 F. Supp. 771, 776
(N.D. Cal. 1972). But see Center for Nat'l Policy Review on Race & Urban Issues
v. Weinberger, 502 F.2d 370, 373-74 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (recognizing the need to protect
the privacy of the subjects of past investigations); Cowles Communications, Inc. v. De-
partment of Justice, 325 F. Supp. 726 (N.D. Cal. 1971) ("['1n this day of increasing
concern over the conflict between the citizen's right of privacy and the need of the
Government to investigate, it is unthinkable that rights of privacy should be jeopardized
further by making investigatory files available to private persons").
221. See Center for Nat'l Policy Review on Race & Urban Issues v. Weinberger,
502 F.2d 370, 374 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Cowles Communications, Inc. v. Department of
Justice, 325 F. Supp. 726, 729 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
222. The District of Columbia Circuit cases effectively protected a subject's privacy
because the exemption attached indefinitely once a court concluded that an investigatory
file had been compiled for law enforcement purposes. See note 216 supra.
223. See notes 198-204 supra.
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actually employed will effectively safeguard individual privacy interests
remains to be seen.224
Interpretation of the original exemption seven complemented and
closely paralleled the treatment accorded exemption four,225 illustrating
again the judicial myopia toward personal privacy interests under the
FOIA. In both instances, courts ignored substantial individual inter-
ests and failed to consider whether disclosure would further the goal
of the FOIA: improving government accountability. In considering
both the advantages and the disadvantages of disclosure, therefore,
courts consistently undervalued the privacy interest in nondisclosure
and overvalued the utility of release. Although the exemptions as cur-
rently written might effectively safeguard personal privacy, the judicial
bias against privacy in FOIA suits has ominous implications for the ba-
lancing process now required by exemptions six and seven.
2. The Agencies as Guardians of Privacy
More fundamental problems with the FOIA as a guardian of privacy
are inherent in the structure of the Act. The FOIA is a disclosure sta-
tute--disclosure is never prohibited. 226  In general, federal agencies
rather than individuals are responsible for claiming the exemptions.
Neither the FOIA nor the Privacy Act2e 7 requires an agency to notify
the subject of a record that information about him has been requested
under the FOIA. Accordingly, when an individual surrenders personal
information to an agency, he effectively appoints that agency legal
guardian of his right to privacy.228  Unfortunately, the agency is an in-
competent guardian.
The FOIA assumes that the agencies will vigorously assert each ap-
plicable exemption because their interest always lies in withholding
information. Ordinarily, agency interests coincide with the inter-
ests protected by the exemptions, and accordingly, this assumption is
perfectly sound. The Department of State, for example, will always
224. For further discussion of the seventh exemption, see Project, supra note 12,
at 1085-1101.
225. See notes 205-12 supra and accompanying text.
226. See Davis, supra note 197, at 806. See also A. MiLLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRI-
VACy: COMPUTERS, DATA BANKS, AND DoSsIERs 154 (1971).
227. See notes 81-82 supra and accompanying text.
228. For a good discussion of this problem, see O'Reilly, Government Disclosure
bf Private Secrets Under the Freedom of Information Act, 30 Bus. L. Rev. 1125 (1975).
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want to protect national security information from disclosure.229  Be-
cause the agency is the best and most logical representative of these
interests, it is the proper party to assert the exemption. This criti-
cal assumption of the FOIA is incorrect, however, when applied to
the privacy exemptions. Unlike national security, the agency has no
inherent interest in protecting individual privacy; the incentive for a
strong defense is missing. 230  Moreover, judicial interpretation of the
FOIA has compounded this structural defect. To prevent frivolous
claims of exemptions, courts have made it increasingly difficult for
agencies to withhold information. In the leading case of Vaughn v.
Rosen,3 1 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that
conclusory allegations would not support a claim of exemption.232 In-
stead, the agency must make a "relatively detailed analysis [of the
material] in manageable segments, '2 33 and specify which parts should
be exempt and why. 34 The Vaughn index is an excellent means to
discourage recalcitrant agencies from indulging their usual preference
for secrecy. In the context of the privacy exemptions, however, the
disincentives far outweigh the minimal benefits the agency obtains from
withholding personal information. Many agencies may prefer to
disclose information rather than fight,235 especially in light of the ab-
sence of any penalty for wrongful disclosure under the FOTA.
229. See Note, Executive Privilege and the Freedom of Information Act. The Con-
stitutional Foundation of the Amended National Security Exemption, 1976 WASH.
U.L.Q. 609.
230. HEW REPORT, supra note 1, at 65. The HEW REPORT correctly recognizes
that the FOIA "is an instrument for disclosing information rather than for balancing
the conflicting interests that surround the public disclosure and use of personal records."
Id. at 35. The REPORT urged: "that the [FOIA] be amended to require an agency
to obtain the consent of an individual before disclosing in personally identifiable form
exempted-category data about him, unless the disclosure is within the purposes of the
system as specifically required by statute." Id. at 65-66. The REPORT correctly notes
that although adopting such an amendment might result in less disclosure, it would not
detract from the effectiveness of the FOIA.
231. 484 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 977 (1974).
232. Id. at 825.
233. Id. at 826.
234. Id. at 827.
235, Vaughn properly held that an agency wishing to reap the benefits of an exemp-
tion must show that withholding is justified. The problem is that an agency frequently
derives no benefit from an exemption that protects individuals' interests. Thus, in those
instances the Vaughn requirements are inappropriate. The FOIA should be amended
to prohibit disclosure of personal information unless the subject of the data is given
notice and an opportunity to be heard. See HEW REPORT, supra note 1, at 35-36;
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Before the Privacy Act, the majority of courts further exacerbated
this problem by finding that an agency could disclose information not-
withstanding the applicability of one of the nine exemptions-that is,
the exemptions are merely discretionary.286 To permit the government
to waive exemptions designed to protect its own interests makes per-
fect sense; to allow the government to waive the individual interests
underlying exemptions four, six, and seven, however, is ludicrous.
These exemptions should be mandatory.217  Even if an agency is com-
pelled to assert an exemption, however, its claim is likely to be half-
hearted. The FOIA thus contains an inherent procedural defect that
significantly reduces its ability to protect personal privacy.
Courts have proven insensitive to the problem of the wrong party
in interest. The issue has arisen in a few "reverse FOIA" suits, in
which plaintiffs have attempted to prevent disclosure of trade secrets
protected by the fourth exemption.18  These suits present problems
comparable to the privacy exemptions because the agency's interest in
retaining future information sources is not wholly synonomous with in-
O'Reilly, supra note 228. For a discussion of Vaughn, see 87 HARv. L. Rnv. 854
(1974).
236. See Charles River Park "A", Inc. v. Department of HUD, 519 F.2d 935 (D.C.
Cir. 1975); Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc. v. I.T.O. Corp., 508 F.2d 945, 950 (4th
Cir. 1974); Davis, supra note 197, at 76 ("[tlhe exemptions protect against required
disclosure, not against disclosure"). Although the question has been sparsely litigated,
the legislative history supports the view that agencies have discretion to release exempt
information. See S. REP. No. 93-854, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) 6: "Congress
did not intend the exemptions... to be used either to prohibit disclosure of information
or to justify automatic withholding of information. Rather, they are only permissive."
See also Project, supra note 12, at 158-60; Note, Access to Broadcasters' Financial Statc-
ments Filed with the FCC: The Freedom of Information Act Alternative, supra note
197, at 157; Note, Freedom of Information: The Statute and the Regulations, 56 GEo.
L.. 18, 28 (1967). But see note 237 infra.
237. See Continental Oil Co. v. FPC, 519 F.2d 31, 35-36 (5th Cir. 1975) (agency
cannot always disclose even if subject to exemption); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v.
Schlesinger, 392 F. Supp. 1246, 1250 (E.D. Va. 1974); McCoy v. Weinberger, 386 F.
Supp. 504, 506 (W.D. Ky. 1974).
238. See Charles River Park "A" Inc. v. HUD, 519 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1975);
Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. Rumsfeld, 70 F.R.D. 595 (N.D. Ohio 1976); Westinghouse
Elec. Corp. v. Schlesinger, 392 F. Supp. 1246 (E.D. Va. 1974); Neal-Cooper Grain
Co. v. Kissinger, 385 F. Supp. 769 (D.D.C. 1974); Sears Roebuck & Co. v. GSA, 384
F. Supp. 996 (D.D.C.), stay dissolved, 509 F.2d 527 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Hughes Aircraft
Co. v. Schlesinger, 384 F. Supp. 292 (C.D. Cal. 1974). For discussion of reverse FOIA
suits in general, see Project, supra note 12, at 1157-62; Comment, Reverse-Freedom of
Information Act Suits: Confidential Information in Search of Protection, 70 Nw. U.L.
REv. 995 (1976).
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dustry's interest in keeping trade secrets. Although courts have granted
the reverse FOIA plaintiff standing to sue, 80 the agency decision on
the merits usually prevails.240 Courts reason that Congress granted
agencies the sole power to assert an exemption, and the agency deci-
sion is reversible only if arbitrary or capricious.2 41 Those parties chal-
lenging release, and the one court that has enjoined disclosure have
relied, at least in part, on statutory provisions outside the FOIA.242 The
courts have yet to realize that some exemptions protect a variety of
public and private interests and that public agencies cannot be expect-
ed to assert purely private interests.
This brief review of the FOIA highlights the degree to which both
Congress and the courts have misunderstood the complex interaction
between individual privacy and government accountability. If Con-
gress, in drafting the Privacy Act, did assume that the FOIA struck
an appropriate balance between these two competing interests, the as-
sumption is plainly wrong. The subject of a personal record, not its
governmental custodian, is harmed by its disclosure. Yet only the
latter may invoke the FOIA exemptions.2 43  In construing the privacy
239. See Comment, supra note 238, at 1000 (no court has denied standing, but no
court has considered the problem either).
240. Charles River Park "A" Inc. v. HUD, 519 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Neal-
Cooper Grain Co. v. Kissinger, 385 F. Supp. 769 (D.D.C. 1974) (denial of preliminary
injunction); Sears Roebuck & Co. v. GSA, 384 F. Supp. 996 (D.D.C.), stay dissolved,
509 F.2d 527 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Schlesinger, 384 F. Supp. 292
(C.D. Cal. 1974); cf. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc. v. I.T.O. Corp., 508 F.2d 945, 950
(4th Cir. 1974) (dictum that agencies have complete discretion to release exempt infor-
mation).
241. Charles River Park "A" Inc. v. HUD, 519 F.2d 935, 941-43 (D.C. Cir. 1975);
Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. Rumsfeld, 70 F.R.D. 595, 601 (N.D. Ohio 1976); Comment,
supra note 238, at 1011-13.
242. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Schlesinger, 392 F. Supp. 1246, 1250 (E.D.
Va. 1974) (relying in part on 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1970) in granting relief in reverse
FOIA suit); Sears Roebuck & Co. v. GSA, 384 F. Supp. 996, 1001-02, stay dissolved,
509 F.2d 527 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (rejecting several statutory grounds on which reverse
FOIA plaintiff had relied).
243. In addition to the exemptions, two provisions of the Act authorize agencies
to delete identifying details from materials the disclosure of which would otherwise pro-
duce an unwarranted invasion of privacy. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2) & (b) (Supp. V
1975). The addition to section (b) requires that "[alny reasonably segregable portion of
a record shall be provided to any person requesting such record after deletion of the
portions which are exempt. . . ." While subsection (b) may permit broader disclosure,
it does not alter the exemptions or give agencies a greater incentive to invoke them.
For discussion of this provision, see Project, supra note 12, at 1046.
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exemptions, the courts usually overstate the public value of releasing
personal data and ignore the privacy interest in nondisclosure. 244
On a more fundamental level, the subordination of the Privacy
Act to the FOIA again exposes the congressional preference for a
simplistic statute to the difficult task of balancing and reconciling
competing interests. This decision is tragic, not only because it wholly
sacrifices privacy but because the sacrifice is unnecessary. Iden-
tifiable personal records have little to do with the FOIA's ultimate goals
of developing an informed electorate and improving government ac-
countability. Protecting individuals from the release of such files would
significantly advance personal privacy interests with minimal effect on
the underlying values served by the FOIA. As it did in drafting the
law enforcement exemptions, 245 however, Congress preferred to adopt
a blanket solution rather than make the hard choices required to fash-
ion an effective and comprehensive approach to resolving the conflict
between personal privacy and the public's right to know. In so choos-
ing, Congress gave new meaning to Arthur Miller's plaintive lament
that "in a very backhanded way, [the FOIA] probably does more to
end privacy in the United States, ostensibly in pursuit of the public's
right to know, than any other enactment in the last fifty or sixty
years." 240
244. Courts have blindly pursued a policy of demanding broad disclosure and have
forgotten that "broad disclosure" was merely the means adopted under the FOIA to
enable the public to know about how the Federal Government conducts its activities.
See HEW REPORT, supra note 1, at 64. When that policy mandates the disclosure
of personal information which not only fails to further the primary goal of the Act,
but also threatens the equally important societal goal of protecting personal privacy,
then it is time to re-evaluate that policy. Perhaps, as Judge MacKinnon admonished
in his concurring opinion to Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 681 (D.C. Cir. 1971),
amendment of the FOIA is the only alternative:
[This] is not the sort of disclosure that Congress basically had in mind in
enacting the [FOIA]. But in my opinion the Act as it presently exists practi-
cally requires the disclosure of [names and addresses] on demand. One need
not elaborate on the various abuses that could result if lists of people as classi-
fied by the Government for particular purposes became available practically
on demand in wholesale lots. If this situation is to be corrected, it will require
an amendment to the Act.
For additional arguments in favor of amending the FOIA, see A. MILLER, supra note
226, at 154-61; A. Wes-iN, supra note 2, at 387; Data Bank Hearings, supra note 11,
at 826 (statement of A. Westin); Davis, supra note 197, at 291.
245. See note 196 supra and accompanying text.
246. Data Bank Hearings, supra note 11, at 25 (statement of A. Miller).
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3. Interaction between the FOIA and the Privacy Act
The congressional decision to exempt FOIA information from many
of the substantive requirements of the Privacy Act has some curious
and probably unintended consequences. The interaction of the two
statutes illustrates, as nothing else, the complete congressional failure to
understand the complexity of the privacy problem. In general, the Pri-
vacy Act subordinates substantial privacy interests to insignificant
FOIA interests. In some respects, however, the Privacy Act may en-
courage a reinterpretation of the FOIA, improving the latter Act's abil-
ity to protect individual privacy interests. Nevertheless, the FOIA's
defects are so great, and the congressional intent to leave it unchanged
so apparent, that amendment of the FOIA is probably the only means
to strike the correct balance between the individual's right to privacy
and the public's right to government information.
The consent provisions in subsection (b) of the Privacy Act best
illustrate Congress' inability to comprehend the inadequacy of the
FOIA's privacy exemptions. Subsection (b) prohibits disclosure of a
personal record without the subject's consent.2 7 Subsection (b)(2)
waives this requirement for material whose disclosure is required by
the FOIA. 2 4  The original House bill contained no such provision and
was intended to "make all individually identifiable information in
government files exempt from public disclosure" under the FOIA.249
The original Senate bill exempted all records whose disclosure was
either required or permitted by the FOIA.25 ° Although the final draft
of the Senate bill omitted this provision,2 ' an altered version of it
mysteriously reappeared in the Compromise Amendments and the Act
as passed. 5 -
247. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) (Supp. V 1975). See note 84 supra and accompanying
text.
248. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) (2) (Supp. V 1975).
249. H.R. REP. No. 93-1416, supra note 54, at 3.
250. S. REP. No. 93-1183, supra note 6, at 71.
This provision was included to meet the objections of press and media represen-
tatives that the statutory right of access to public records and the right to dis-
closure of government information might be defeated if such restrictions were
placed on the public and press. The Committee believed it would be unreason-
able and contrary to the spirit of the Freedom of Information Act to attempt
keep, [sic] an accounting of the nature and purpose of access and disclosures
involving the press and public or to impose guarantees of security and confi-
dentiality on the data they acquire.
251. See 120 CONG. REc. S19,831 (daily ed. Nov. 21, 1974). The provision ap-
peared to have been abandoned; no explanation was given.
252. See 120 CONG. Rnc. S21,816 (daily ed. Dec. 17, 1974).
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The final version of subsection (b) is a distinctly mixed blessing. In
limiting the waiver of the consent requirement to instances in which
the FOIA requires disclosure, it improves both the original Senate pro-
posal and the FOIA by removing agency discretion to waive the FOIA
privacy exemptions.253 Specifically, if one of these exemptions applies,
the FOIA does not require disclosure, subsection (b) of the Privacy
Act still applies, and the Privacy Act prohibits disclosure absent the
subject's consent. A corollary of this requirement is a significant im-
provement in the success of reverse FOIA suits. When courts have re-
jected such suits on the merits, the rationale has been agency discretion
to waive or assert the privacy exemptions. 2 4 By depriving agencies of
that discretion, subsection (b) makes the privacy exemptions manda-
tory and grants the reverse FOIA plaintiff a legal right under the Pri-
vacy Act to prevent disclosure.
Unfortunately, the structural defects in the Privacy Act and the
FOIA largely nullify the practical benefit of making the FOIA privacy
exemptions mandatory. A reverse FOIA suit is possible only if the
subject learns of the request for his personal records in time to object.
Because neither Act requires agencies to notify the subject of such re-
quests, 55 the agency may disclose personal information before he can
assert his rights. In practice, therefore, the wrong party in interest-the
agency-must still assert the exemption. The agency's probable fail-
ure to represent individual interests vigorously may result in the dis-
closure of personal information that should remain confidential."
Technically, such halfhearted agency action may violate the Privacy
Act. Indeed, one commentator has noted with alarm the agencies' ex-
posure to FOIA suits if they invoke the exemption, and to damage suits
under the Privacy Act if they fail to assert it.257 This dilemma is wholly
theoretical. The plaintiff's burden of proof in a damage suit under the
Privacy Act is so great that only in rare cases can the victim expect
recovery.258 In any reasonably close case, disclosure should avoid lia-
bility under both statutes.
Several other provisions of the Privacy Act exacerbate the problem
created in subsection (b). Ordinarily, subsection (c) requires an
253. See notes 236-37 supra and accompanying text.
254. See notes 23842 supra and accompanying text.
255. See note 257 infra and accompanying text.
256. See notes 226-35 supra and accompanying text.
257. See Comment, supra note 203, at 627-31.
258. See notes 147-56 supra and accompanying text
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agency to keep, and make available an accounting of the date, nature,
purpose, and recipient of each disclosure of a personal record.259 Sub-
section (c)(1) waives this obligation for disclosures required by the
FOIA.2 "' This provision is difficult to justify.261  Its only benefit is
to relieve agencies of the administrative task of recording what personal
information is released and to whom. The damage to individual sub-
jects far outweighs this trivial concern. The absence of an accounting
assures that many individuals will never discover that agencies have
wrongfully disclosed their records under the guise of the FOIA, and
thereby erects still another barrier to effective enforcement of the
Privacy Act. Moreover, waiving the accounting requirement prevents
the subject from tracing and correcting unreliable information disclosed
by federal agencies to private parties.
The inability to restrict the use of personal information subsequent
to its disclosure pursuant to the FOIA would lead one to assume that
federal agencies should at least be required to assure the quality of re-
cords so released. Congress recognized that because the restrictions
in the Privacy Act apply only to federal agencies, disclosure to any party
other than another federal agency threatens privacy more seriously than
do interagency transfers. 262  Accordingly, subsection (e)(6) requires
the custodial agency to check a record for accuracy, timeliness, com-
pleteness, and relevance before releasing it to parties outside the feder-
al government. '' 63 The absence of an accounting requirement for
FOIA disclosures rendered this subsection the individual's only pro-
tection against disclosure of unreliable data. Nevertheless, (e)(6) is
inapplicable to disclosures required by the FOIA. 64 The sole ration-
ale for this exemption is the need for speedy processing of FOIA re-
259. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(c) (Supp. V 1975). See note 85 supra and accompanying
text.
260. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(c)(1) (Supp. V 1975).
261. The reason given for releasing agencies from the duty to keep an accounting
is that it would be contrary to the spirit of the FOIA (see note 250 supra); this consti-
tutes no justification at all. Since the public's right to know is the antithesis of the
individual's right to privacy, attempts to protect one interest will frequently intrude
on the other. The question then should not be "is this provision of the Privacy Act
contrary to the FOIA?", bui rather "how can we protect privacy without seriously im-
pairing the public's right to know?" When the problem is addressed in this light, the
congressional solution embodied in subsections (b) (2) and (c) (1) of the Privacy Act
is clearly unsatisfactory.
262. See notes 133-35 supra and accompanying text.
263. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e) (6) (Supp. V 1975).
264. Id.
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quests; 265 acceptance thereof demonstrates a congressional preference
for speed to privacy.
The Privacy Act's various exemptions for FOIA disclosures and the
FOIA's inability to safeguard individual privacy require one of two con-
clusions: either Congress intentionally subordinated privacy interests to
public information interests in every case of conflict, or Congress was
wholly ignorant of the complex interaction between the two statutes.
There are problems with each conclusion.
The first conclusion at least produces a simple rule for courts to
follow when considering the conflict between individual privacy and the
public's right to know. It is hard to believe, however, that Congress
really intended to sacrifice privacy at every juncture. First, the uni-
lateral sacrifice of privacy is unnecessary: requiring an accounting of
FOIA disclosures, for example, would promote privacy interests with-
out measurably impeding the operation of the FOIA. Secondly, this in-
terpretation attributes to Congress the perverse desire to eliminate
agency regulations precisely when they are most needed.2 60 Given the
strong congressional desire to enact privacy legislation, and the explicit
recognition of the agencies as the foremost enemy of privacy, Congress
surely could not have intended to leave the protection of privacy in the
hands of the agencies. It makes little sense to assume that Congress
intentionally subordinated the Privacy Act to the FOIA knowing the
consequence to be the pointless destruction of significant aspects of the
Privacy Act. It seems apparent, therefore, that Congress simply failed
to realize that the FOIA could not adequately protect privacy and that
subordinating the Privacy Act to the FOIA is tantamount to sacrificing
privacy interests. This conclusion would suggest that courts should con-
sider the principles underlying both the Privacy Act and the FOIA to
attempt a reconciliation of their conflicting demands.
The underlying purpose of the Privacy Act is to protect informational
privacy-to ensure that each individual has control over the information
that directly affects his life.2"" The purpose of the FOIA is to develop
an informed public able to make intelligent electoral choices and to en-
sure that government remains accountable to the people.20 8 Focusing
265. See OMB Guidelines, supra note 69, at 60.
266. Most disclosures to which subsection (e) (6) applies, for example, will be re-
quired by the FOIA. Nevertheless, subsection (e) (6) is by its terms inapplicable in
these instances.
267. See note 54 supra and accompanying text.
268. See note 196 supra aud 4ccompanying test,
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on the underlying purposes would permit courts to give effect to both
legislative intents. If disclosure would do little to promote government
accountability, releasing the information would be inappropriate, espe-
cially if it would involve a serious invasion of individual privacy. Con-
versely, if release would significantly improve government account-
ability without seriously injuring privacy interests, disclosure would be
appropriate. In any given case, the courts should balance the under-
lying interests served by each statute.
Fortunately, the sixth exemption to the FOJA would readily permit
this type of interest balancing.26 The Supreme Court's recent inter-
pretation of this exemption in Department of the Air Force v. Rose 70
makes it clear that courts must balance "the individual's right to privacy
against the preservation of the basic purpose of the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act ..... ,27. The Privacy Act dictates that any disclosure of
personal information without consent always constitutes an invasion of
privacy. Unless disclosure would substantially further the underlying
goals of the FOIA, courts should liberally apply the exemption to refuse
disclosure without the consent of the subject.
The problem with this approach is that it would require explicit ju-
dicial recognition of congressional ignorance. Given the explicit legis-
lative history demonstrating congressional satisfaction with the FOIA,272
courts are more likely to conclude that Congress intentionally, if un-
intelligently, chose to sacrifice privacy interests in favor of the public's
right to know.
In this event, amendment of the FOIA would be the most sensible
course to pursue. Specifically, agencies should be required to notify
the subject of a record prior to disclosing information about him in
identifiable form.73  The agency should also supply the individual with
a copy of the requested record and notice that failure to object within
a specified time will constitute consent to disclosure. A less desirable
amendment could require agencies to keep an accounting of disclosures
and to assure the reliability of records disclosed under the FOIA.
269. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (6) (1970). See notes 205-12 supra and accompanying text.
270. 425 U.S. 352 (1976).
271. Id. at 372.
272. The legislative history states clearly that the Privacy Act was designed to "pre-
serve the status quo as interpreted by the courts regarding the disclosure of personal
informaton under [the FOIA]." 120 CONG. REc. S21,816 (daily ed. Dec. 17, 1974).
See Project, supra note 12, at 1336-40.
273. See note 235 supra.
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V. CONCLUSION
We live in a society in which personal information has assumed ever-
increasing importance in fulfilling our most critical social responsibil-
ities. The development of the computer and the increasing amount
of personal information in governmental hands, however, poses sub-
stantial and growing dangers for the congeries of interests encompassed
by the notion of privacy. The Privacy Act of 1974 attempts to resolve
this dilemma, as the courts and the common law could not, by estab-
lishing substantive and procedural restrictions on the gathering and use
of information about Americans by government agencies.
Although the Privacy Act is in many respects disappointing, it is
nevertheless the most important piece of federal privacy legislation
since the fourth amendment.274 The Act exhibits an understanding of
the serious problems posed by computers and is conceptually sound.
At the very least, it constitutes an expression of congressional policy
that will prompt federal agencies to exercise greater caution in handling
personal information. Perhaps most important, the Privacy Act ena-
bles ambitious individuals to control the flow of information about
them, to assure agency compliance with the Act, and to recover dam-
ages for serious invasions of privacy that were not actionable at com-
mon law.
The defects in the Privacy Act are structural. The failure to provide
for an independent commission to aid in the enforcement of the Act
was inexcusable. The Act places responsibility for assuring agency
compliance almost exclusively upon the individual, but gives him
neither the tools nor the incentive to do so. The absence of required
notice to subjects of records, the inadequate regulations concerning ex-
isting files containing material in violation of the Privacy Act, and the
unsatisfactory remedies under the Act render it an unenforceable state-
ment of policy.
In the final analysis, however, the Privacy Act's most serious defi-
ciency is the failure to make even a serious attempt to accommodate pri-
vacy with such crucial conflicting interests as effective law enforcement
and the public's right to know. Indeed, whether by design or inadver-
tance, Congress adopted a scheme in both instances that systematically
sacrifices the very interests the Privacy Act purports to protect. Nothing
short of amendment will remedy these defects.
274. See 120 CONG. REc. H12,243 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1974) (remarks of Rep. Moore-
head) (discussing significance of Privacy Act).
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